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INTRODUCTION.
Technological developments in life sciences have revolutionized health
care, with the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries leading the way
in job creation and economic growth in the United States.1 Advances in
information technology have sparked the Internet’s social media platforms,
transforming the way citizens interact.2 Now, social media has the potential
to transform the landscape of entrepreneurship in health care by providing
more capital to currently-overlooked startups through crowdfunding.3
For instance, in 2010, a medical student at Johns Hopkins University, Dr.
Jimmy Lin, founded the Rare Genomics Institute (“RGI”) because he was
devastated as he listened to a colleague explain to a patient’s mother that no
treatments existed for her child’s rare genetic disease.4 What is unique about
RGI is that it employs crowdfunding, the raising of small amounts of money
online from multiple sources, to fund part of its operations.5 Although RGI
represents a donation-based model of crowdfunding, where there are no
securities or investors but only donors, its success demonstrates that

1. For instance, nationwide investment in the human genome project is credited
with a revolutionizing genomic science, contributing to millions of new jobs and
hundreds of billions in economic growth. BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION
(BIO), BATTELLE/BIO STATE BIOSCIENCE INDUST. DEV. 2012 2 (June 19, 2012),
http://www.bio.org/sites/default/files/v3battelle-bio_2012_industry_development.pdf
(“$10.4 billion investment in basic sciences during the 1993 to 2010 period drove $796
billion in economic impact, and created 3.8 million job-years of employment over this
period.”).
2. See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521
F.3d 1157, 1176 (9th Cir. 2008) (J. McKeown, concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(observing the “vast number” of interactive websites like Facebook and Google that
increasingly allow people to, “[o]n a daily basis, . . . rely on the tools of cyberspace to
help [them] make, maintain, and rekindle friendships; find places to live, work, eat, and
travel; exchange views on topics ranging from terrorism to patriotism; and enlighten
[them]selves on subjects from ‘aardvarks to Zoroastrianism.’” (quoting Ashcroft v.
ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 566 (2002)); see also World Internet Usage and Population
Statistics,
INTERNET
WORLD
STATS
(June
30,
2012),
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (indicating there to be 2.4 billion “Internet
users” worldwide as of June 2012, representing 34% of the estimated world population).
3. See generally David Chase, This Could Change Healthtech Startup Funding
Forever,
FORBES
BLOG,
(Jul.
8,
2012,
10:27am),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/davechase/2012/07/08/this-could-change-healthtech-startupfunding-forever/ (“MedStartr is like most crowdfunding sites that are non-equity. They
have plans later to have an equity model once SEC rules are clarified.”).
4. E.B. Solomont, Lin’s Rare Genomics: Crowdfunding A Way To A Cure, ST.
LOUIS BUS. J. (Aug. 3, 2012, 5:00 am), http://www.bizjournals.com/stlouis/printedition/2012/08/03/lins-rare-genomics-crowdfunding.html.
5. Id.
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crowdfunding has the power to bring disparate individuals with common
concerns together through the internet to actually fund an enterprise—in this
case an organization addressing rare genetic disorders.6
Although some patient-focused innovations have emerged, such as
smartphone applications for heart rate monitoring and microscopic computer
chips for measuring athletic performance,7 the decentralization of the
Internet has been slow to organically deliver more consumer-driven, lowcost innovations in the health care industry.8 Companies such as Google
have tried to introduce a consumer-based model for storing personal medical
records,9 but really it took Congressional action to begin the mass
integration of electronic medical records.10
The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (“JOBS Act”),11 signed by
President Barack Obama on April 5, 2012, is intended to harness the internet

6. Interview with Dr. Jonathan Franca-Koh on Rare Genomics Institute’s Use of a
Grass Roots Approach to Raise Funds for Patients (May 22, 2013),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2fmY1EDT2P0 (explaining that there is a “very large
group of people affected by rare diseases because, although each particular rare disease
affects few people, there are so many of them that the population is actually very great,”
but that “the resources made available to these communities is a lot less,” thus providing
the incentive and opportunity for RGI to use grassroots fundraising like crowdfunding).
7. See Adam Sege, Monitoring Your Body, Unobtrusively: New Flexible Sensors on
Skin Yield Crucial Data: Chips Check Routine Things Like Hydration, Threats Like
Concussion,
BOS.
GLOBE,
Dec.
31,
2012,
at
B.5,
available
at
http://bostonglobe.com/business/2012/12/31/body-sensors-from-cambridge-firm-poisedfor-market/ERVhzpkBHtQy9MO2eS1PgI/story.html.
8. See Kathleen Sebelius, The New Momentum Behind Electronic Health Records,
KAISER
HEALTH
NEWS
(Aug.
26,
2010),
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Columns/2010/August/082610Sebelius.aspx (“Today,
in almost every other sector besides health, electronic information exchange is the way
we do business. . . . [D]espite the clear benefits of health IT, only two in ten doctors and
one in ten hospitals use even a basic electronic record system. . . . Over the last 30 years,
we’ve watched information technology revolutionize industry after industry, dramatically
improving the customer experience and driving down costs.”) (emphasis added).
9. Aaron Brown & Bill Weihl, An Update On Google Health And Google
PowerMeter, GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG (last updated Jul. 15, 2011),
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/06/update-on-google-health-and-google.html.
10. The Recovery Act, not private industry, was the major catalyst for the
development of electronic medical records. See Fred Schulte, Stimulus Fuels Gold Rush
For Electronic Health Systems, HUFFINGTON POST, (last updated May 25, 2011, 3:35pm),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/11/05/stimulus-fuels-gold-rush_n_347311.html
(“The government’s $45 billion plan to jump-start a national shift to electronic medical
records has touched off a gold rush.”).
11. Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat 306, 315-23 (2012) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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to modernize small business capital formation.12 This Comment posits that
the subsection of the JOBS Act concerning crowdfunding could have a
transformative impact on the financing of health care startups, particularly
emerging biotechnology companies.13
Title III of the JOBS Act
(“CROWDFUND Act” or “Title III”)14 legalized equity-based crowdfunding
by establishing a new exception under federal securities laws. On October
23, 2013, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or
“Commission”) voted unanimously to propose a set of crowdfunding rules
(hereinafter “Proposed Crowdfunding Rule”),15 with a public comment
period ending on February 3, 2014.16
The CROWDFUND Act permits the online sale of securities to an
unlimited number of investors (i.e. a large “crowd”) in small amounts using
the power of social media.17 The CROWDFUND Act permits entrepreneurs
to raise up to $1 million in capital through “funding portals” (or

12. President Obama’s Remarks on Signing the JOBS Act, 2012 DAILY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 1-2 (Apr. 5, 2012), reprinted in 2012 U.S.C.C.A.N. S4 (“[F]or start-ups and small
businesses, this bill is a potential game changer. . . . For the first time, ordinary
Americans will be able to go online and invest in entrepreneurs that they believe in.”).
13. Chase, supra note 4 (“With the need to reinvent health care and the challenge to
getting a startup off the ground in the health care industry, [healthcare crowdfunding
website] MedStartr seeks to fill an important market gap. By no means will it replace
venture capital, but it can get more companies to that stage of their company’s
development.”); see also Mari Serebrov, Senate Adds Investor Protection for
Crowdfunding to JOBS Act, BIO WORLD TODAY (Mar. 26, 2012),
http://www.bioworld.com/content/senate-adds-investor-protection-crowd-funding-jobsact-0 (“The reforms that make up the JOBS Act are especially important to biotechs that
are forced to spend investor dollars on compliance when they don’t yet have product
revenue, said Jim Greenwood, president and CEO of the Biotechnology Industry
Organization.”).
14. CROWDFUND is short for the Capital Raising Online While Deterring Fraud
and Unethical Non-Disclosure Act of 2012. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 301305, 126 Stat. 306, 315-23 (2012).
15. Press Release, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, SEC Issues Proposal on Crowdfunding (Oct.
23,
2013),
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370540017677#.Unw1bfkq
iJE [hereinafter SEC Issues Proposal].
16. Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 33-9470, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428 (Nov.
5, 2013) (amending 17 C.F.R. §§ 200, 227, 232, 239, 240 and 249); see also infra Part
V.B.
17. See C. Steven Bradford, The New Federal Crowdfunding Exemption: Promise
Unfulfilled, 40 SEC. REG. L. J. 195, 196 (2012) [hereinafter Promise Unfulfilled]
(discussing the JOBS Act and describing crowdfunding, as when “[a]n entrepreneur, or
anyone else who needs money, publishes an appeal for funds on a publicly accessible
web site, and that appeal is communicated to the general public through the site.”).
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intermediaries)18 by offering and selling securities over the Internet, without
triggering the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 (“the
1933 Act”).19 The CROWDFUND Act attempts to harness the Internet and
social media to boost capital-raising prospects for small issuers.20 To
accomplish this goal, Congress significantly altered decades-old federal
securities laws,21 and after some initial delay,22 on October 23, 2013 the
Commission unanimously voted to propose eagerly-anticipated
crowdfunding rules.23
Before the adoption of the JOBS Act, the 1933 Act prohibited companies
from selling securities online in this fashion.24 For example, intermediary
websites intending to host a startup company’s offering of securities could

18. “Funding portals” are a new type of regulated entity created by the
CROWDFUND Act and are essentially the websites empowered to host the offering of
securities by the crowdfunding issuers online. See JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §
302(a), (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(C) (2012)) (requiring “funding portal” to
comply with certain conditions for exemption to be effective); see also Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(80), JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 304(b), 126 Stat.
306, 322 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(80) (2012) (defining funding portal).
“Issuer” is defined infra, note 20.
19. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(a), 126 Stat. 306, 315 (2012) (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)) (establishing an exemption from registration requirements of the
Section 5 of the 1933 Act).
20. An “issuer” is defined in the 1933 Act as “every person who issues or proposes
to issue any security.” Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(4), (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
77b(a)(4)). Once an issuer’s offering or sale of securities implicates registration
requirements under the federal securities laws, the issuer becomes subject to civil and
criminal liability for noncompliance or materially false misstatements in various required
disclosures. See, e.g., the Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11, 12, 17, 24 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). For this and other reasons, it is desirable for smaller
issuers to find ways to avoid triggering the registration requirements of the 1933 Act.
21. JOBS Act, Pub. L. 112-106, §§ 302-306, 126 Stat. 315-323 (2012) (enacting 15
U.S.C. §§ 77d-1 and enacting and amending 15 U.S.C §§ 77d, 77r, 78c, 78l, and 78o);
JOBS Act Significantly Alters Federal Securities Laws, BALLARD SPAHR LLP (Apr. 6,
2012),
http://www.ballardspahr.com/alertspublications/legalalerts/2012-0406_jobs_act_significantly_alters_federal_securities_laws.aspx.
22. J.D. Harrison, Deadline Approaching For Crowdfunding Regulators, WASH.
POST, Nov. 19, 2012, at A09, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/onsmall-business/as-deadline-approaches-regulators-face-mounting-concerns-overcrowdfunding-rules/2012/11/16/fb3f1e02-3031-11e2-ac4a-33b8b41fb531_story.html
(pointing out that the JOBS Act set a deadline of December 31, 2012 for the SEC to
adopt crowdfunding rules, and the self-regulatory body for broker-dealers, the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), is also required to draft rules—but with no
corresponding deadline).
23. SEC Issues Proposal, supra note 15.
24. Bradford, Promise Unfulfilled, supra note 17, at 249 (pointing out “formidable
obstacles under federal securities laws” to crowdfunding).
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be required to register as brokers,25 investment advisors, or both.26
Additionally, the startups, known in securities and corporate law as
“issuers,” soliciting investors for crowdfunding investments would
themselves be required to register such securities offerings with the SEC,27
which can be burdensome and costly.28 To grease the wheels of commerce,
the CROWDFUND Act created a new exemption from these requirements
just for crowdfunding, which could potentially fill a critical capital gap
among startups in the health care industry.29
Due to the passage of Title III, startups like Dr. Lin’s Rare Genomics
Institute can utilize social media not merely to solicit donations from
sympathetic strangers, but to actually offer strangers an equity stake in his
growing business. Individuals scattered throughout the country that share
medical concerns30 or that occupy similar roles in the health care system
(e.g. nurses, doctors) could be united through social media and attracted to
innovative solutions in the industry. This Comment considers the potential
impact that the CROWDFUND Act could have on startup financing for
emerging biotech companies, and assesses the appropriate level of
supervision of this emerging industry by the SEC, in particular regarding the
statutory investment limits.
25. Section 3(a)(4)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines “broker” as
any intermediary “engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the
account of others.” 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (2012).
26. Bradford, Promise Unfulfilled, supra note 17, at 196 (“[C]rowdfunding web sites
hosting offerings of securities could be required to register as brokers under the Securities
Exchange Act or as investment advisers under the Investment Advisers Act.”).
27. Absent an exemption, it is unlawful to sell securities unless a registration
statement is in effect as to those securities. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. §
77e(a)(1) (2012).
28. Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding Or Fraudfunding? Social Networks And The
Securities Laws—Why The Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned On
Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735, 1744 (2012) (describing the registration of
securities as “an expensive and otherwise burdensome process that presents barriers to
small businesses’ access to the U.S. capital markets.”).
29. Timothy Hay, MedStartr Thinks Crowdfunding Will Work For Med-Tech, WALL
S T.
J.
BLOG,
(Jun.
26,
2012,
1:16pm),
http://blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/2012/06/26/medstartr-thinks-crowdfunding-willwork-for-med-tech/.
30. Larry Gerrans, Sanovas Remarks on “How Crowdfunding Affects the Healthcare
Market,
and
Your
Wallet”,
SANOVAS
C O.
NEWS,
http://www.sanovas.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=928:sanovas
-remarks-on-qhow-crowdfunding-affects-the-healthcare-market-and-yourwalletq&catid=46:company&Itemid=58 (arguing that “[w]ith social media as the driver,
communities and industries can invest in their collective interest. The Life Science
community is especially well suited to answer this call. . . . Sentimentally, Crowdfunding
presents the entrepreneur with an incredibly meaningful socioeconomic mandate.”).
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Section I of this Comment introduces the prohibitions of the Securities
Act of 1933,31 its exemptions,32 and emphasizes the significance of the
common law interpretation that the primary purpose of federal securities law
is investor protection.33 Section I also details how the JOBS Act’s new
registration exemption altered federal securities laws, and how the
exemption is likely to impact the development of Internet-based
crowdfunding for startups. Section II briefly summarizes the legislative
history of the JOBS Act. Section III posits that crowdfunding presents a
valuable capital-raising strategy for biotech startups. Section IV warns that
investors, intermediaries, and especially biotech startup companies should be
worried about fraudsters exploiting the crowdfunding space. Section V
outlines the self-certification standard, whereby intermediaries are able to
rely on investors’ assurances concerning their income and investments in
other crowdfunding ventures,34 and discusses the advantages and
disadvantages of the Proposed Crowdfunding Rule. The conclusion
emphasizes the need for meaningful enforcement of the investment limits in
the CROWDFUND Act for a stable crowdfunding industry, preferably with
the use of third party verification services overseen by the SEC or the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”).
I. THE NEW ROLE OF CROWDFUNDING IN FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW.
A. The Exemptions to Securities Act Registration.
The Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act” or “Securities Act”) was passed
with the intention of protecting the investing public from fraud.35 It requires
any offering of securities36 to be registered with the SEC, unless an
31. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a)(1) (2012).
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c-77d.
33. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
34. 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,469-66,470.
35. At the time, President Franklin D. Roosevelt regarded the law’s passage as a shift
towards consumer protection. Hazen, supra note 26 (citing Message to Congress from
President Franklin Roosevelt (Mar. 29, 1933), quoted in H.R. Rep. No. 73-85, 73rd Cong.
(1933) (“This proposal adds to the ancient rule of caveat emptor, the further doctrine, ‘let
the seller also beware.’ It puts the burden of telling the whole truth on the seller. It
should give impetus to honest dealing in securities and thereby bring back public
confidence.”)).
36. The 1933 Act lists various financial products in its definition of a “security,”
which includes most forms of stock and notes. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(a)(1) (2012).It also includes any “investment contract,” which courts have defined
as any “transaction or scheme” involving an investment of money in a common
enterprise with the expectation of profits based primarily on the efforts of others. SEC v.
W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99, (1946); see also United Hous. Found., Inc. v.
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exemption is available,37 and imposes liability for fraud involved in such
selling efforts.38 Since the text states that “it shall be unlawful for any
person, directly or indirectly” to offer to buy or sell securities unless a
registration statement has been filed with the SEC,39 it is the 1933 Act’s
exemptions that shape the contours of federal securities regulation. One
principal exemption is found in Section 4(1), which exempts transactions by
any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer.40 Other provisions
involve exempting certain securities and intrastate offerings.41
Judicial interpretations of section 4(2)’s “private placement” exemption
reveal the courts’ generally expansive view of the scope of the 1933 Act’s
protections. The Supreme Court, in Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Ralston Purina
Co.,42 articulated the legislative intent of Congress in passing the 1933 Act,
saying the intent was to protect investors who are not otherwise “able to fend
for themselves” in public markets.43 In subsequent cases where issuers tried
to avoid registration requirements by claiming a private placement
exemption,44 lower courts looked to the investor’s financial sophistication
and measured the extent to which the investor had access to information

Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 860 (1975); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476,
482 (9th Cir. 1973).
37. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. §77e(c) (2012).
38. Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11, 12(a)(1), 12(a)(2), 15, 17, 24 (codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C. § 77).
39. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. §77e(c) (2012) (emphasis added).
40. The Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(1) (2012). “Dealer” is
defined in § 2(a)(12) as “any person who engages . . . in the business of . . . dealing or
trading in securities.” “Underwriter” is defined expansively in § 2(a)(11) to include
“any person . . . who offers or sells for an issuer in connection with . . . a distribution of
any security,” any purchaser “with a view to . . . the distribution of any security,” or
anyone who participates in any such undertaking.
41. See, e.g., the Securities Act of 1933 Act § 3(a)(2).
42. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
43. Id. at 124-25. The SEC filed suit against Ralston Purina, disputing the
company’s policy of selling common stock to hundreds of key employees without
registration. The defendant argued that such offers were exempt from securities laws
because they constituted private placements under what is now § 4(2) of the 1933
Securities Act. The Court disagreed, holding that the registration exemptions ought to be
viewed in light of the legislative intent of the Act, which is to promote full disclosure of
company information so that investors can make informed decisions. The Court declared
that non-executive personnel, such as the company’s chow loading foreman and stock
clerk, were entitled “to have access to the kind of information which registration would
disclose.” Id. at 127.
44. Section 4(2) exempts transactions by an issuer “not involving any public
offering,” also known as a private placement. Among the exemptions for private
placements are Regulation D offerings. The Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. §
77d(a)(2).
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adequate enough to make an informed investment decision.45 Thus, unless
an issuer can demonstrate46 that a purchaser was sophisticated and had
adequate access to information about the issuer, whether through disclosures
made prior to the securities transaction or by virtue of his relationship to the
issuer, the private placement exemption will not be available.47
Courts have since varied in their approach to the relative weight given to
this bifurcated information-sophistication test,48 thus leading to uncertainty
among issuers.49 In response, the SEC adopted Regulation D (“Reg. D”),50 a
set of rules providing a reliable safe harbor to ensure a private placement

45. See Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 902-03 (5th Cir. 1977)
(establishing that even sophisticated parties require information in order for the issuer to
enjoy a private placement exemption); see also SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463
F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1975) (denying the availability of a § 4(2) exemption where investors
had adequate access to information but were unsophisticated).
46. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953) (“Keeping in mind the
broadly remedial purposes of federal securities legislation, imposition of the burden of
proof on an issuer who would plead the exemption seems to us fair and reasonable.”).
47. For example, issuers are liable to purchasers for violating § 5 of the 1933 Act and
a purchaser/investor is entitled under § 12(a)(1) to seek rescission of such transactions.
48. See, e.g., SEC v. Kenton Capital, Ltd., 69 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 1998)
(“Courts applying [the Ralston Purina] mandate have identified various factors that
should be considered in determining whether an offering is exempt under section 4(a):
the number of offerees, the relationship of the offerees to each other and the issuer, the
manner of the offering, information disclosure or access, and the sophistication of the
offerees.”).
49. E.g., compare Doran, 545 F.2d at 906-08 (focusing on quality of disclosure by
the issuer and the level of investor access to information in assessing propriety of a §4(2)
exemption) (emphasis added), with Lively v. Hirschfield, 440 F.2d 631, 633 (10th Cir.
1971) (arguing for “strict” interpretation of Ralston Purina where a private placement
exists for “only persons of exceptional business experience” with regular access to all the
relevant information); see also John Coffee, Jr. and Hillary A. Sale, SECURITIES
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 347-48 (12th ed. 2012), (comparing Lively’s focus
on a “seemingly higher standard” of investor sophistication for a private placement
exemption with Doran’s “focus more on the quality of the disclosure provided by the
issuer.”).
50. The SEC may, “by its rules and regulations” exempt certain securities from
registration requirements if it finds that “enforcement . . . with respect to such securities
is not necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors by reason of the
small amount involved or the limited character of the public offering,” which shall not
exceed $5 million. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(1) (2012). The
Commission has used this authority broadly. C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the
Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 87 (2012) [hereinafter
Crowdfunding] (pointing out that, even before passage of the JOBS Act, the SEC “clearly
ha[d] the authority to exempt crowdfunding from the registration requirements of the
Securities Act and to exempt crowdfunding web sites from registration as brokers or
investment advisers” under section 3(b) and section 28).
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exemption if certain conditions are met.51 For smaller issuers in particular,
including the type of entrepreneurs who may be interested in crowdfunding,
Reg. D has become a popular alternative to risking the uncertainty involved
in a judicial or SEC administrative proceeding featuring discussions of the
sophistication of a purchaser.52 Although Reg. D simplified the private
placement pathway, it is worth noting that Ralston Purina is by no means
antiquated, and endures as a guidepost for determining whether an issuer can
properly claim a private placement exemption under the statute. Ralston
Purina also serves as a useful backdrop against which to measure other
exemptions and rules: “[t]he focus of inquiry should be on the need of
[investors] for the protections afforded by registration.”53 This basic
proposition of securities law should be kept in mind as the SEC continues to
draft the rules for a new crowdfunding exemption.
B. Debt and Equity Crowdfunding.
Crowdfunding refers generally to the raising of funds online in small
amounts from a large group of people.54 It is a phenomenon purely of the
Internet-age, but its roots are derived from crowdsourcing and microfinance.55 Crowdsourcing is the pooling together of resources around a
common goal,56 while micro-finance, or micro-lending, refers to targeted
lending in small amounts to borrowers, who are often in poorer,
undercapitalized regions abroad.57
Modern crowdfunding can be
categorized into five types, “distinguished by what investors are promised in
return for their contributions: (1) the donation model; (2) the reward model;
(3) the pre-purchase model; (4) the lending model; and (5) the equity
model.”58 Prior to the JOBS Act, and without any action by Congress or the
SEC, companies could validly raise funds using crowdfunding by selecting
51. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-508 (2013).
52. VLAD IVANOV AND SCOTT BAUGUESS, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, CAPITAL RAISING IN
THE U.S.: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF UNREGISTERED OFFERINGS USING THE REGULATION D
EXEMPTION (Feb. 2012), http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/acsec103111_analysisreg-d-offering.pdf.
53. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 127 (1953).
54. Bradford, Crowdfunding, supra note 50, at 5.
55. Id. at 27-28.
56. Id. (describing examples such as the Internet-based encyclopedia Wikipedia,
open-sourced operating system Linux, and Google, “which captures the sites that
everyone collectively is linking to and visiting.”).
57. Id. at 28-29. (explaining how micro-lending has ballooned from its modern
origins as one $27 investment in Bangladesh to a multi-billion industry).
58. Id. at 14. For a detailed account of these different approaches to crowdfunding,
their respective prevalence, and which types most obviously run afoul of federal
securities laws, see Professor Bradford’s comprehensive discussion. Id. at 14-42.
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only some of these techniques— issuing securities (i.e. the equity model)
was forbidden.59 For instance, various websites like Kickstarter60 and
Indiegogo,61 already charge entrepreneurs fees for hosting an offering of
“perks” or rewards in exchange for contributions from an online universe.62
However, because these sites are hosting enterprises that only seek
donations63 or give out products to contributors, such as an audio CD
produced by an artist, federal securities law are not implicated.64
In fact, Congressional action technically may not have been necessary to
permit equity and debt investments (securities transactions) because the SEC
already has the authority to exempt such transactions.65 However, before the
JOBS Act, it was uncommon in the U.S. for companies to even appear to be
offering a stake in their enterprise in exchange for investments from online
users because the SEC had not explicitly exempted such transactions, and
the penalty of unwittingly triggering securities regulation can be costly.66

59. Bradford, Promise Unfulfilled, supra note 17, at 196-97.
60. KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2013).
61. INDIEGOGO: AN INTERNATIONAL CROWDFUNDING PLATFORM TO RAISE MONEY,
http://www.indiegogo.com/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2013).
62. Bradford, Crowdfunding, supra note 50, at 16-20.
63. See, e.g., Brett Zongker, Crowd-Funding Draws Donations for Sandy Relief,
BOS.
GLOBE
(Dec.
22,
2012),
http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2012/12/23/crowd-funding-draws-donationsfor-sandy-relief/ojJjmbsJ1ou8rdXKdi7Z5H/story.html (“While Congress considers a $60
billion disaster aid package for the storm victims, hundreds of them have gotten quicker
results by creating personalized fundraising campaigns on sites including GoFundMe,
IndieGoGo and HelpersUnite.”).
64. Bradford, Crowdfunding, supra note 50, at 15-26 at 31-32. (observing that
consuming a product is not indicative of investment contract and that “contributors to
donation-model sites are offered nothing else, such as stock or notes, that would fall
within the general definition of a security”) (citing Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471
U.S. 681 (1985); Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990)); see also supra, note 36
(discussing the Howey test and definition of an investment contract).
65. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. §77c(b)(1) (2012) (allowing the SEC
to exempt “any class of securities” if it finds that enforcement “is not necessary in the
public interest and for the protection of investors by reason of the small amount involved
or the limited character of the public offering,” the aggregate offering amount of which is
not to exceed $5 million); see also id. § 28, 15 U.S.C. 77z-3 (stating the SEC “by rule or
regulation, may conditionally or unconditionally exempt any person, security, or
transaction . . . from any provision or provisions of this subchapter or of any rule or
regulation issued under this subchapter, to the extent that such exemption is necessary or
appropriate in the public interest, and is consistent with the protection of investors.”).
66. Bradford, Crowdfunding, supra note 50, at 24 (citing “regulatory issues” raised
by equity-based crowdfunding for its unpopularity in the U.S.).
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One case demonstrates how, prior to the passage of the JOBS Act, two
unsuspecting executives ran afoul of federal securities regulation.67
In November of 2009, two advertising executives agreed to a cease-anddesist order from the SEC for failing to register a securities offering with the
SEC.68 They started a website called BuyBeerCompany.com, purportedly
to purchase Pabst Blue Ribbon for $300 million, and promoted the website
over Facebook and Twitter, ultimately attracting $200 million in pledges
from five million individuals online.69 Although the executives’ attorney
said they were only experimenting with crowdsourcing and did not expect
such a response, the SEC was not amused. The Commission found that,
although “[n]o monies were ever collected,” this solicitation of investments
over social media, in exchange for a “crowdsourced certificate of
ownership” (as well as beer), on the premise of acquiring Pabst Blue
Ribbon, constituted an offer of securities that “was not registered with the
Commission, nor exempt from registration,” and thus in violation of section
5(c) of the 1933 Act.70 This high-profile case was later credited with
sparking a Congressional hearing on crowdfunding.71
The CROWDFUND Act has provided a pathway for the sort of
fundraising contemplated by the Pabst campaign, because it added section
4(a)(6) to the 1933 Securities Act, exempting all transactions where offers
and sales of securities are made through crowdfunding portals online from
the section 5(c) registration requirement.72 However, it is worth noting that
the statute would not necessarily have paved the way for the $300 million
acquisition of Pabst because of the $1 million cap.

67. Chad Bray, Huge Beer Run Halted by Those No Fun D.C. Regulators, WALL. ST.
J. BLOG (June 8, 2011, 4:05 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/06/08/huge-beer-runhalted-by-those-no-fun-d-c-regulators/ (outlining that “Steven Berkowitz, [the
defendants’] lawyer, said the duo simply wanted to conduct an experiment online in
crowdsourcing and saw that Pabst was for sale at the time.”).
68. See Michael Migliozzi II, Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings
Pursuant to section 8A of the Securities Act of 1933, Making Findings, and Imposing a
Cease-and-Desist Order, Securities Act Release No. 9216 (June 8, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2011/33-9216.pdf.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2-3.
71. Andrew Ackerman, Fizzled Beer Deal Prompts ‘Crowd-Funding’ Hearing,
WALL. ST. J. (Sept. 14, 2011, 3:53 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903927204576570614068591324.html.
72. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(6), JOBS Act.
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C. Reg. D and Small Offering Exemptions.
The SEC may already have had the authority to exempt crowdfunding
transactions under section 3(b) of the 1933 Act, which grants broad authority
to the SEC to exempt from registration certain securities purchases where
the Commission deems it “not necessary in the public interest and for the
protection of investors by reason of the small amount involved or the limited
character of the public offering.”73 After all, the SEC’s mission is not only
to protect investors and maintain orderly markets, but to facilitate capital
formation.74 To this end, in the 1980s the SEC acted on its section 3(b)
authority to create rules fulfilling part of the purpose behind today’s
crowdfunding exemption. As a result, in 1982 the SEC adopted Rules 501508 to form Regulation D (“Reg. D”), which provides several safe harbors
for the private offering exemption under section 4(2) of the Securities Act.75
Reg. D offerings are the dominant capital raising strategy among private
offerings, and Rule 506 is the most popular.76 Rule 506 is the most
prevalent capital-raising strategy under Reg. D because it permits companies
to sell an unlimited dollar amount of securities to accredited investors and up
to thirty-five non-accredited investors, so long as the issuer reasonably
believes that those purchasers have “such knowledge and experience in
financial and business matters that [they are] capable of evaluating the
merits and risks of the prospective investment.”77 Rule 504 and 505
offerings are capped at $1 million and $5 million, respectively, and Rule 505
is limited to thirty-five or fewer “nonaccredited investors.”78 An accredited
investor includes any individual with an income above $200,000 (or
$300,000 along with a spouse), most banks, businesses, upper-level
management of the issuer; and individuals with a net worth exceeding
$1,000,000.79 Importantly, the valuation of net worth excludes one’s
primary residence, 80 so as not to be over-inclusive.

73. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(1) (2012); see also supra
note 65.
74. FY14 CFTC, SEC Budget Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Services
and General Government of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 113th Cong. (2013)
(testimony of Mary Jo White, Chairman, SEC) (remarking on the SEC’s “three-part
mission: to protect investors, maintain . . . efficient markets, and facilitate capital
formation.”).
75. Revision of Certain Exemptions From Registration for Transactions Involving
Limited Offers and Sales, 47 Fed Reg. 11,251, 11,258 (proposed Mar. 16, 1982).
76. IVANOV & BAUGUESS, supra note 52.
77. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (2012).
78. Id. § 230.505.
79. Id. § 230.501(a)(1-8).
80. Id, § 230.501(a)(5)(i)(A)
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Under Rule 506, issuers are permitted to sell an unlimited number of
securities to accredited investors because those investors are deemed
financially sophisticated enough to comprehend the risks involved in the
investment.81 To protect investors and the public broadly, limitations are in
place regarding the manner in which securities are issued under Reg. D. For
example, under Rules 505 and 506, resale limitations are put in place.82
Further, issuers and others are prohibited from engaging in “general
solicitation or general advertising” through newspapers, magazines, TV, or
radio advertisements,83 unless all of the purchasers are accredited
investors.84
Reg. D is therefore important to understand for several reasons. As
discussed above, Reg. D plays a dominant role in the recent trend of private
placements eclipsing public offerings, suggesting that offerings made under
the crowdfunding exemption could benefit from this market appetite for
nonpublic offerings. Further, as discussed in greater detail below: (1)
crowdfunding may compete with Reg. D as a capital formation strategy
among life science and biotech startups; (2) some issuers may seek to
combine these capital-raising strategies, raising novel regulatory issues for
the SEC; and (3) the JOBS Act’s repeal of the general advertising ban, and
the SEC’s recent rule implementing its repeal, may indicate the direction the
SEC will take on other JOBS Act rulemakings.
1. Filling a Critical Capital Gap for Small Issuers.
Reg. D provides a significant and reliable safe harbor from registration
requirements for small issuers, and accordingly, this has proven to be a
popular route for small businesses wishing to avoid the costs of registration
and provides an important capital formation function.85 The primary policy
goal of Reg. D offerings was to facilitate capital formation for small
businesses.86 The SEC staff has since observed a recent trend where the
amount of capital raised in private placements (i.e. nonpublic offerings),

81. Id. § 230.501(e)(1)(iv) (excluding accredited investors from inclusion in §
230.506(b)(2)(ii)). See also supra, notes 48-50 and accompanying text (discussing policy
rationale for Reg. D’s Rule 506).
82. Id. §§ 230.505(b)(1), 506(b)(1) (requiring that “offers and sales must satisfy” the
terms of §§ 230.501 and 230.502).
83. 17 C.F.R. §230.502(c) (2012) (prohibiting the offering and selling of securities in
Reg. D offerings “by any form of general solicitation or general advertising,” except as
provided in § 230.504(b)(1)).
84. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c) (2012); see also 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771 (Jul. 24, 2013).
85. IVANOV & BAUGUESS, supra note 52.
86. Id. at 1 (referring to “the original regulatory objective to target the capital
formation needs of small business”).
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such as those through Reg. D, has actually eclipsed the capital raised in
publicly registered offerings.87 The amount of capital raised privately
surpassed public offering amounts in 2010 and 2011 by, respectively, 8%
(an estimated $1.16 trillion compared to $1.07 trillion) and 3%.88
This trend accelerated dramatically in 2012, with private offerings
eclipsing public ones by 42%,89 which underscores the increasing
importance of registration exceptions aimed at small business, in particular
Reg. D.90 Further, the SEC estimates that there were 37,000 Reg. D
offerings initiated between 2009 and 2011 with a median offering price of
$1 million, surpassing $900 billion worth of securities sold in 2010.91
However, even as Reg. D offerings and other private placements are
surging, there are reports of severe capital shortages among small businesses
from the last four years.92 Now that non-equity based crowdfunding has
reached a certain height in popularity, the hope among crowdfunding
advocates is that small issuers may choose Title III over Reg. D offerings,
depending on the success of the SEC crowdfunding rule. Estimates find that
as many as 19% of small business owners would pursue equity investments
via a crowdfunding exemption to fill the void.93 One crowdfunding service
provider used these figures to estimate a potential market of 700,000
companies that could be soliciting investments through online funding

87. Id. at 3.
88. Id.
89. VLAD IVANOV & SCOTT BAUGUESS, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, CAPITAL RAISING IN THE
U.S.: AN ANALYSIS OF UNREGISTERED OFFERINGS USING THE REGULATION D EXEMPTION,
2009-2012,
AN
UPDATE
TO
THE
FEB.
2012
STUDY
8
(2013),
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/whitepapers/dera-unregistered-offerings-reg-d.pdf
(“In 2012, registered offerings accounted for $1.2 trillion of new capital compared to $1.7
trillion raised through all private offering channels.”).
90. Id. at 5.
91. Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r of the Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Public Statement on
Investor Protection is Needed for True Capital Formation: Views on the JOBS Act, (Mar.
16, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch031612laa.htm#P41_18027.
92. THE NAT’L SMALL BUS. ASS’N, Forward to SMALL BUSINESS ACCESS TO CAPITAL
SURVEY (July 11, 2012), http://www.nsba.biz/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Access-toCapital-Survey.pdf (“According to the survey, nearly half (43 percent) of small-business
respondents said that, in the last four years, they needed funds and were unable to find
any willing sources, be it loans, credit cards or investors.”).
93. Id. at 10; but see MICHAEL T. RAVE, ET. AL., DAY PITNEY LLP, JOBS ACT—ON
REGULATION A, REGULATION D AND CROWDFUNDING PROVISIONS 5 (Apr. 19, 2012),
http://www.daypitney.com/news/docs/dp_4117.pdf (predicting the opposite will occur,
“relegating crowdfunding to the realm of companies that are unable to get the backing of
professional investors”).
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portals by the third year of crowdfunding.94 This may be an optimistic
assessment; estimates of the state of growth and size of the crowdfunding
industry vary widely,95 and predictions vary according to the assumptions
made about growth and the veracity of the underlying data.96 However,
these trends in the growth of private placements may suggest, at the very
least, a healthy appetite for alternative capital-raising strategies among small
firms seeking to avoid SEC registration.
2. SEC Proposed to Allow Concurrent Crowdfunding and Reg. D.
Offerings.
One thing that may satisfy some of the critical funding gaps outlined
above is the SEC’s proposal to allow issuers to fundraise using both a
crowdfunding 4(a)(6) and Reg. D. exemption simultaneously. For instance,
one major question following passage of the JOBS Act was whether an
issuer would be able to take advantage of new lax advertising rules
mandated under Title II to attract accredited investors, while simultaneously
employing the crowdfunding exemption under Title III to attract
unaccredited investors.97 The SEC’s proposed crowdfunding rule98 cleared
94. Brian Knight, Dir. of Entrepreneur Servs., Crowdcheck, Letter to SEC and
Comment on Regulatory Initiatives Under the JOBS Act: Title III—Crowdfunding (Dec.
5, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-iii/jobstitleiii-185.htm.
95. See Bradford, Promise Unfulfilled, supra note 17, at 196 (describing
crowdfunding as growing into “a billion-dollar industry”) (citing Natalie Huet, European
Start-Ups
Court
Crowds
for
Cash,
REUTERS
(May
9,
2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/09/finance-crowdfundingidUSL5E8G50RB20120509); see also THE ECONOMIST, The New Thundering Herd,
Wanted: Small Sums Of Money To Finance Young Companies (June 16, 2012), available
at http://www.economist.com/node/21556973 (claiming “[c]rowdfunding is booming. . . .
[according to a] report by Massolution, a research firm, forecast[ing] that $2.8 billion will
be raised worldwide this year, up from $1.5 billion in 2011 and only $530m in 2009.”);
see also Roger Yu, Crowd Funding Fuels Businesses, Charities, Creative Ventures, USA
TODAY (May 31, 2012, 3:20 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/story/201205-29/crowd-funding-websites/55288516/1 (citing “a report by Crowdsourcing.org,” an
industry group, to claim “[a]bout $1.5 billion was raised in 2011 by about 450 crowdsourcing Internet sites worldwide”); but see Felix Salmon, Annals Of Dubious Statistics,
Crowdfunding Edition, REUTERS (July 27, 2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/felixsalmon/2012/07/27/annals-of-dubious-statistics-crowdfunding-edition/
(questioning
billion-dollar estimates).
96. Knight, supra note 94 (conceding that “there is a very limited amount of
information available, and what information exists is often widely divergent”).
97. Chris Tyrrell, et al., CrowdFund Intermediary Regulatory Advocates (“CFIRA”)
Letter to SEC and Comment on SEC Regulatory Initiatives Under JOBS Act: Title III, at
1-2. (Oct. 29, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-iii/jobstitleiii-169.pdf
[hereinafter CFIRA Comment Letter] (calling it “unclear how the SEC’s historical
integration criteria are implicated by the crowdfunding and Regulation D reforms of the
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up this question, proposing to allow other exempt offerings concurrently
alongside a crowdfunding-exempt offering by saying the Staff will not
consider the two offerings “integrated.”99 Generally speaking, the SEC’s
integration doctrine prevents an issuer from doing indirectly what it is
prohibited from doing directly.100 It is designed to disallow issuers from
piling exemption on exemption to circumvent the rules. However, in part
because of the $1 million cap on crowdfunding issuers, the SEC stated:
[W]e believe that an offering made in reliance on Section 4(a)(6)
should not be integrated with another exempt offering made by the
issuer, provided that each offering complies with the requirements
of the applicable exemption that is being relied upon for the
particular offering. An issuer could complete an offering made in
reliance on Section 4(a)(6) that occurs simultaneously with, or is
preceded or followed by, another exempt offering.101
This proposal is particularly meaningful for issuers wishing to generally
solicit accredited investors but who also want to seek crowdfunding
investors. Title II of the JOBS Act directed the SEC to lift the ban on
general solicitation and advertising of securities in smaller offerings.102
There were two important qualifications to the statutory exemption: all
purchasers of the securities must be accredited investors,103 and the issuer
“[must] take reasonable steps to verify that purchasers of the securities are
accredited investors.”104 Congress thus mandated in the JOBS Act that the
SEC permit the general solicitation and advertising of securities, previously
JOBS Act,” questioning “whether an issuer can conduct crowdfunded offerings
concurrently with offerings under other exemptions, such as Regulation D,” and asserting
“it is unclear whether integration will be applied to crowdfunded offerings at all”).
98. Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 33-9470, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428
(proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (amending 17 C.F.R. §§ 200, 227, 232, 239, 240 and 249),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-11-05/pdf/2013-25355.pdf.
99. 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,431.
100. 78 Fed. Reg. 66,431, at n.27 (“The integration doctrine seeks to prevent an issuer
from improperly avoiding registration by artificially dividing a single offering into
multiple offerings such that Securities Act exemptions would apply to multiple offerings
that would not be available for the combined offering.”).
101. 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,432.
102. The JOBS Act § 201(a)(1) (mandating the SEC to amend its regulations “to
provide that the prohibition against general solicitation or general advertising contained
in § 230.502(c) of such title shall not apply to offers and sales of securities made pursuant
to § 230.506, provided that all purchasers of the securities are accredited investors.”).
103. As defined by Securities Act Rule 501(a). The term accredited investor includes
most banks, businesses, upper-level management of the issuer, and individuals with a net
worth over $1,000,000. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(1-8).
104. The JOBS Act § 201(a)(1). See infra notes 131-36 (listing the qualifying
“reasonable steps” adopted in the final rule).
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banned on, for instance, TV, the Internet, or newspapers,105 so long as the
ultimate purchasers are accredited investors.106
After an initial rule proposal in August 2012, SEC Commissioners voted
4-1 in July of 2013 to adopt a new final Rule 506(c) under the Securities
Act.107 The final rule was published in the Federal Register on July 24,
2013.108 As of September 23, 2013, issuers were cleared to begin soliciting
investors by advertising unregistered securities over the Internet, provided
that all purchasers are accredited investors.109 Though the method of these
communications is now unrestricted, these solicitations are still subject to
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.110
The SEC said it received “concerns” about the possible integration in the
period before its proposed crowdfunding rule.111 The Staff may receive
even more comment letters considering whether or not the proposed nonintegration is appropriate, given potential compliance concerns, not to
mention the conflicting statutory goals of the repeal of the general
solicitation ban and the adoption of the crowdfunding exemption. Regarding
the latter, the general solicitation repeal targets accredited investors, while
the crowdfunding exemption is associated with special investor protection
measures to mitigate the risks of attracting the general public to an online
offering.112
Regarding potential compliance issues, consider, for instance, that nonintegration would permit firms to generally advertise to the public under
Rule 506(c), inadvertently attracting non-accredited investors to its 4(a)(6)
crowdfunding portal, which possibly circumvents the crowdfunding
advertising rules.113 Under the Crowdfunding Rule Proposal, issuers are

105. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c)(1) (limiting the general advertising of securities offered
or sold under Reg. D in any form, including “[a]ny advertisement, article, notice or other
communication published in any newspaper, magazine, or similar media or broadcast
over television or radio”).
106. The JOBS Act § 201(a)(1).
107. Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising
in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771 (Jul. 24, 2013) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230, 239 and 242).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 44,772 (“The final rule and form amendments are effective on September
23, 2013”).
110. Id. at 44,785.
111. Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 33-9470, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428 at
66,431.
112. CFIRA Comment Letter, supra note 97, at 3.
113. Id. at 2-3 (“permitting an issuer to conduct a single offering in separate tranches
and to treat each tranche separately for compliance purposes would enable the issuer to
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prohibited from advertising the terms of a 4(a)(6) offering to the public,
“except for notices that direct investors to the intermediary’s platform.”114
The content of a permissible crowdfunding advertising notice is restricted to
essentially: 1) a statement that the issuer is conducting an offering (along
with the name of the intermediary); 2) the terms of the offering; and 3) some
limited factual information about the identity of the issuer.115
However, consider a circumstance where an issuer purchases a 506(c)exempt Super Bowl TV advertisement viewed by the entire American
football fan base, accredited and non-accredited investors alike. After the
game, say a curious non-accredited investor conducts an Internet search to
locate the issuer with the intent of investing, but finds the funding portal
hosting that issuer’s ongoing crowdfunding offering. If the investor
purchased shares via the crowdfunding intermediary, would the SEC staff
interpret that investor to be a “purchaser” for purposes Rule 506(c)’s
accredited status verification requirement? It is arguable that such a nonaccredited investor is a purchaser because, technically, the first time he
heard about the offering was in the commercial—not in a crowdfundinglimited notice. In this case, it would be debatable whether all of the
purchasers involved in the generally-advertised offering could ultimately
qualify as accredited investors, as required by 506(c),116 or whether the
issuer was merely seeking to condition the market for its crowdfunding
venture using a Super Bowl ad. With the ubiquity of internet search engines
and smart phones, it is not unreasonable to imagine that many nonaccredited investors’ first action would be to conduct a web search of the
issuer after seeing such an ad, only to find the funding portal.
One crowdfunding group emphasized this very issue to the SEC,
requesting that the “Commission provide clarification regarding the
solicitation activities that are appropriate in concurrent or almost-so
crowdfunding and 506 offerings.”117 For its part, the SEC’s crowdfunding
rule proposal asked more questions than it answered in this regard.118
circumvent the 35-non-accredited investor participation limit and still claim the benefit of
the Rule 506 safe harbor”).
114. 78 Fed Reg. at 66,555 (Nov. 5, 2013) (proposing C.F.R. §227.204(a)).
115. 78 Fed Reg. at 66,555 (Nov. 5, 2013) (proposing C.F.R. §227.204(b)(1-3)). The
factual information is limited to the name of the issuer, its address, phone, email address,
Web site, and a brief description of its business. Id.
116. CFIRA SEC Comment Letter, supra note 97, at 3.
117. Id. at 3.
118. Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 33-9470, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428 at
66,433 (asking no fewer than 10 integration questions, among them whether the Staff
should “prohibit an issuer from offering securities in reliance on Section 4(a)(6) within a
specified period of time after or concurrently with a Rule 506(c) offering under
Regulation D involving general solicitation?”).
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However, in the example above, it is doubtful the SEC would destroy the
506(c) exemption, since the investor was then subject to the investor
protections of the crowdfunding offering. However, this is an example of
potential timing and market conditioning issues that the SEC may confront
in disallowing integration of 4(a)(6) offerings.
If permitted in the final rule on crowdfunding, the ability of an issuer to
“piggyback” a $1 million offering in crowdfund-exempt transactions along
with other Reg. D safe harbors would be particularly significant for
biotechnology and pharmaceutical startups, because such firms typically
generate high administrative and research costs.119 These high costs at the
outset are a major contributor to what makes life science startups
characteristically high-risk ventures, driving up the cost of capital in the
early stages.120 While the crowdfunding exception could be a lifeline for
some biotechnology startups,121 the $1 million cap placed on issuers
employing the crowdfunding exemption may also limit the value of the
exemption for small businesses,122 and particularly, for life science
companies.123 Therefore, the SEC’s proposal to allow for concurrent
offerings alongside crowdfunding may provide more hope for life sciences
startups to raise far more than the $1 million under the JOBS Act’s new
exemptions, provided that the SEC clarifies potential timing and solicitation
issues.

119. IAN COCKBURN & JOSH LERNER, ANALYSIS GROUP, THE COST OF CAPITAL FOR
EARLY-STAGE
BIOTECHNOLOGY
VENTURES
2-3
(Jun.
29,
2006)
http://www.analysisgroup.com/uploadedFiles/News_and_Events/News/Cockburn_Lerner
_CoC_in_%20Biotech.pdf (estimating cost of capital for life science startups to be 20%
compared to average for all public companies of 10%); see also Press Release, Nat’l
Venture Capital Ass’n (“NVCA”), Cost of Capital For Early Stage Biotech Start-Ups
Found To Be In Excess Of 20 Percent (July 10, 2009) (citing COCKBURN & LERNER) and
Press Release, Office of Rep. Anna Eshoo (D-CA), Rep. Eshoo Hosts Briefing on
Follow-On Biologics, (Jul. 10, 2009) (hyper-linking to COCKBURN & LERNER and stating
that Congressional briefing featured NVCA presentation of study).
120. COCKBURN & LERNER, supra note 119, at 6 (identifying several challenging
features unique to biotech ventures: long marketing timelines, illiquid assets, high levels
of risk, and capital-intensive technology costs); see also infra, Part III.A.1.
121. Krist Werling, Bob Cohen, & Michael Pilo, The Risks and Perils of
Crowdfunding, GENETIC ENGINEERING & BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWS (Mar. 5, 2013),
http://www.genengnews.com/gen-articles/the-risks-and-perils-of-crowdfunding/4760/.
122. CFIRA Comment Letter, supra note 97, at 3 (“[I]ssuers will likely select raising
capital via a Reg. D offering to avoid the $1 million cap imposed upon crowdfunded
companies”).
123. COCKBURN & LERNER, supra note 119, at 6; but see discussion of the economics
of biotechnology capital formation, infra Part III.A.3.
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3. The SEC’s “Accredited Investor” Verification Standard.
The third reason Reg. D is implicated in the future of crowdfunding is
because the SEC staff’s choices throughout the implementation of Rule
506(c) may offer indications of what can be expected as the SEC processes
comments on its first proposed crowdfunding rule.124 The JOBS Act
directed the SEC to lift the ban on general advertising of securities offerings,
but section 201(a)(1) stated that “[s]uch rules shall require the issuer to take
reasonable steps to verify that purchasers of the securities are accredited
investors, using such methods as determined by the Commission.”125 The
original 2012 Proposed General Solicitation Rule126 adopted a hands-off
approach to this verification requirement by suggesting a flexible standard
that takes into account the facts and circumstances.127 The Commission
identified several factors that investors might use to determine what
constitutes “reasonable steps,” such as the nature of the purchaser, the type
of accredited investor the purchaser claims to be, the amount and type of
information that the issuer possesses about the purchaser, and finally, the
nature of the offering.128 However, commentators largely interpreted the
2012 Proposed General Solicitation Rule as specifically avoiding the
adoption of a hard list of methods indicating what would evidence
“reasonable steps” for future use by regulators and courts.129

124. The public comment period for the crowdfunding rule proposal ends 90 days
after its publication in the Federal Register. Securities Act Release No. 33-9470 (Oct. 23,
2013).
125. The JOBS Act § 201(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
126. Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising
in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 77 Fed. Reg. 54,464 (proposed Sep. 5, 2012) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239).
127. Id. at § 54,467 (proposing a requirement that issuers “‘take reasonable steps to
verify’ that the purchasers of the offered securities are accredited investors” as measured
by an “objective determination, based on the particular facts and circumstances of each
transaction.”).
128. Id.
129. See Sara Hanks, New Rule 506(c): General Solicitation in Regulation D
Offerings,
CROWDCHECK.COM
(Sept.
5,
2012),
http://www.crowdcheck.com/blog/analysis-secs-proposed-rule-506c (“The SEC declined
to specify even a non-exclusive list” of methods it would consider “reasonable steps to
verify” that purchasers are accredited); Dean F. Hanley and Paul Bork, Securities Alert:
SEC Proposes JOBS Act Amendments To Rule 506 And Rule 144A To Remove Ban On
General
Solicitation,
FOLEY
HOAG
LLP
(Sept.
11,
2012),
http://www.foleyhoag.com/publications/alerts-and-updates/2012/september/sec-proposesjobs-act-amendments-to-rule-506-and-rule-144a (stating that “[t]o the dismay of many,
the SEC declined to establish what specifically will constitute ‘reasonable steps,’ instead
indicating that each transaction would be judged based on the facts and circumstances.”).
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After public commenters requested more clarity,130 the SEC outlined a
nonexclusive list of four methods that would qualify under the statutory
standard as “reasonable steps” under Rule 506(c). The General Solicitation
Final Rule outlines four specific non-exclusive methods for issuers
advertising broadly under 506(c) to verify the accredited investor status of
individual purchasers.131 First, for an accredited investor claiming to qualify
as a purchaser in the 506(c) offering by using his or her income level, an
issuer’s reliance on any Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) income statements
from the last 2 years constitutes reasonable steps of verification.132 Second,
an issuer is deemed to satisfy the verification requirement of an investor
claiming to qualify based on his net worth by reviewing his assets (using
bank statements, brokerage statements, etc.) and liabilities (using a credit
report).133 Third, and perhaps key for crowdfunding, is that an issuer can
satisfy Rule 506(c)’s verification requirement by reasonably relying on the
assurances of certain third parties that are already subject to robust
regulation in their own right, such as registered broker-dealers, licensed
attorneys, certified public accountants, and SEC-registered investment
advisers.134 Finally, the SEC will accept reliance on previous investor
qualifications under Rule 506(b) as a way to grandfather in bona fide
accredited investors with a pre-existing relationship with the issuer,135 and
the SEC will also continue to accept the traditional reasonable belief
standard found in Reg. D.136
The SEC conceded it “continue[s] to recognize that a person could
provide false information or documentation to an issuer in order to purchase
securities in an offering made under new Rule 506(c).”137 As will be

130. Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising
in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771, 44,777 (Final Rule published
on Jul. 24, 2013) (“A number of these commenters cited the lack of legal certainty that
the verification requirement has been satisfied in any given situation as the reason why,
in their view, the Commission should include a non-exclusive list of verification methods
in Rule 506(c).”); see also Hanley and Bork, Securities Alert, supra note 129 (“Many
practitioners feel that the SEC should have provided a real safe harbor about what
constitutes a ‘reasonable basis’ for believing that an investor is accredited.”).
131. 78 Fed. Reg. 44,780 (Jul. 24, 2013).
132. Plus, a written confirmation from the investor claiming that he or she expects to
make the same income in the upcoming year. Id. at 44,781.
133. Id. at 44,781.
134. Id. at 44,781-82.
135. Id. at 44,781.
136. Id. at 44,782.
137. Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising
in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771, 44,782 (Jul. 24, 2013) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. Pts. 230, 239, 242).
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discussed below, a similar problem is presented by income or net worth
information provided by crowdfunding investors to intermediaries.
Concerns regarding a flexible, market-based approach, and other
possibilities for compliance with the single-issuer and aggregate investment
limits, are discussed infra in Part V.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CROWDFUND ACT.
A. Congressional Willingness to Capitalize on a Recent Crowdfunding
Phenomenon Led to a Brief Legislative History.
Crowdfunding has been characterized as “a recent phenomenon,” with the
“term crowdfunding first appear[ing] in 2006.”138 The first crowdfunding
website, Kiva, started in 2005,139 and its use has generally increased such
that crowdfunding is now being employed to fund efforts for everything
from filmmaking and music to health care and information technology. The
first crowdfunding bill was introduced in the House of Representatives in
September of 2011 by Republican Representative Patrick McHenry of North
Carolina.140
After passing in the House in November of 2011,141
Congressman McHenry’s crowdfunding bill was incorporated into the
Jumpstart Our Business Startups (“JOBS”) Act with only minor changes and
passed in March 2012.142 However, the Senate replaced the House version
of the crowdfunding exemption with a new Senate provision attached to the
JOBS Act,143 which was the version ultimately signed into law by President
Obama on April 5, 2012.144 The President had announced his support for
crowdfunding only seven months prior to signing it into law.145 Between the
first bill’s introduction in the House and the signing of the JOBS Act by the

138. Bradford, Promise Unfulfilled, supra note 17, at 196.
139. Id.
140. Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act, H.R. 2930, 112th Cong. § 2(a) (2011).
141. Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act, H.R. 2930, 112th Cong. § 2(a) (as passed
and amended by the House on Nov. 3, 2011).
142. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, H.R. 3606 112th Cong., §§ 301-303, Title
III, Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act; see 158 CONG. REC. H1288 (Mar. 8, 2012).
143. Senate Amendment 1884, 112th Cong. (2012).
144. President Obama’s Remarks on Signing the JOBS Act, 2012 DAILY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 1-2 (Apr. 5, 2012), reprinted in 2012 U.S.C.C.A.N. S4.
145. Executive Office of the President, Statement of Administration Policy (Nov. 2,
2011),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/112/saphr2930r_20111
102.pdf (“The Administration supports House passage of H.R. 2930.”).
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B. Bipartisan Passage of the JOBS Act Amid Vociferous Dissent.
Although the JOBS Act passed the Senate with seventy-three votes and
received bipartisan support,147 the crowdfunding exemption was not without
its critics. Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) took to the Senate floor in opposition
to the JOBS Act, saying, “[w]e are about to embark upon the most sweeping
deregulatory effort and assault on investor protection in decades.”148 After
eviscerating the rest of the Act, Senator Levin conceded that the amendment
offered by Senator Jeff Merkley (D-OR) made modest improvements to
reduce crowdfunding risks, but he still implored: “[w]e should not fool
ourselves. These improvements, if adopted, though welcome, are far from
sufficient. . . . If we pass this bill, it will allow new opportunities for fraud
and abuse in capital markets.”149
Similar criticisms of crowdfunding emerged as different proposals wound
their way through Congress.150 Securities expert, Professor John Coffee of
Columbia, for instance, mockingly called Senator Brown’s initial
crowdfunding bill, S. 1791, The Boiler Room Legalization Act of 2011
because of broker registration exemptions.151 Professor Coffee observed:

146. A search of “crowdfunding” in the Congressional Record yields several results
prior to April 2012. Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting
Investors: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 112th
Cong. (2011); Legislative Proposals to Facilitate Small Business Capital Formation and
Job Creation: Hearing before the Subcomm. On Capital Mkts. and Gov’t Sponsored
Enters., H. Comm. on Fin. Svcs, 112th Cong. (2011); Crowdfunding: Connecting
Investors And Job Creators: Hearing before the Subcomm. on TARP, Fin. Svcs. and
Bailouts of Public and Private Programs Subcomm. on TARP, Fin. Svcs. and Bailouts of
Public and Private Programs Oversight and Gov’t Reform Committee, 112th Cong.
(2011). Since the passage of the JOBS Act, however, there have been other hearings in
Congress. JOBS Act in Action Part II: Overseeing Effective Implementation of the JOBS
Act at the SEC, Subcomm. on TARP, Fin. Svcs. and Bailouts of Public and Private
Programs, H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. (2012).
147. 158 CONG. REC. S1977 (Mar. 22, 2012) (detailing Roll Call Vote #55 on passage
of H.R. 3606 with 25 Democrats and 48 Republicans voting in favor).
148. 158 CONG. REC. S1963 (Mar. 22, 2012) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin).
149. Id. at S1964. It is unclear, however, whether Sen. Levin is referring here to the
CROWDFUND Act.
150. See Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting
Investors: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 112th
Cong. 62-66 (2011) (statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law,
Columbia Univ. Law School).
151. Id. at 61,64 (stating that the broker registration exemption presented
“unparalleled opportunities for the traditional boiler room operation to reemerge”).
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Because the maximum aggregate amount that may be raised in any
12-month period is $1 million, this exemption is likely to be used
primarily by early stage issuers that do not yet have an operating
history or, possibly, even financial statements. Such issuers are in
effect flying on a ‘wing and a prayer,’ selling hope more than
substance. Precisely because of this profile, however, such
offerings are uniquely subject to fraud, and some issuers will
simply be phantom companies without any assets, business model,
or real world existence.152
The Senate responded by adopting an amendment sponsored by Senators
Merkley, Bennet (D-CO), and Brown (R-MA) which included key investor
protection measures, such as investment limits.153
Senator Merkley
explained following passage of the CROWDFUND Act that the individual
investment cap is “an important investor protection” provision and that
aggregate caps serve as a stopgap against an investor “unintentionally
wiping out their entire savings.”154 The director of investor protection at the
Consumer Federation of America was still skeptical, warning that
crowdfunding should occupy “precisely the same place in the average
person’s investment portfolio that lottery tickets do . . . If you have a little
spare cash that you think it would be fun to gamble with, that’s fine, but
don’t consider it part of a well-thought-out investment strategy.”155 The
president of the North American Securities Administrators Association has
also expressed concerns, indicating “[s]tates are concerned that the fraud and
scammers will come out of the closets now and start using social networking
sites to rip off investors.”156 Professor Steven C. Bradford of the University
of Nebraska, who has comprehensively addressed crowdfunding in law
review articles and testified before two congressional committees on the
subject,157 expressed disappointment in the final bill, saying Congress

152. Id. at 64.
153. Senate Amendment 1884, 112th Cong. (2012) replaced a House version and was
passed 64-35. 158 CONG. REC. S1976-1977 (Mar. 22, 2012); see also Mari Serebrov, The
Senate Adds Investor Protection for Crowdfunding to JOBS Act, BIO WORLD TODAY
(Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.bioworld.com/content/senate-adds-investor-protectioncrowd-funding-jobs-act-0.
154. 158 CONG. REC S5476 (July 26, 2012).
155. Margaret Collins, Will Crowdfunding Beget Crowdfrauding?, BUSINESSWEEK
(Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-04-26/will-crowdfundingbeget-crowdfrauding.
156. Id.
157. Bradford, Crowdfunding, supra note 50, at 94 (stating “Senator Merkley’s
[crowdfunding] bill also incorporates several of the policy recommendations made in this
article.”); Financial Services and Bailouts of Public and Private Programs, Hearing on
The JOBS Act Before the Subcomm. on TARP, 112th Cong. (2012) (testimony of C.
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“threw together a poorly drafted regulatory bundle of old ideas that is
complicated, expensive, and unlikely to have much of an effect on the small
business capital gap.”158
III. THE POTENTIAL BOON FOR HEALTH STARTUPS.
A. Where Venture Capitalists See High Risk in Life Sciences, Crowdfunding
Investors May See Opportunity for a Cure.
1. Hindrances to Venture Capitalist Investment in Biotech May Not
Apply to Crowdfunding.
The economics of the biotechnology and pharmaceutical sectors
(“biopharma”) are distinguishable from other sectors such as information
technology, in that returns on investment may take much longer, investors
can expect to hold illiquid assets for a long period of time, biopharma
endeavors can be capital intensive in the short term, and the chances that
drugs will actually make it to market are slim.159 Compared to other
startups, venture capitalists investing in biopharma enterprises “need to take
on more risk, hold illiquid investments, and wait longer for a return.”160
Therefore, such equity investments cost more to the issuer. This could be
used as a rationale for pessimism regarding the potential impact of the
crowdfunding legislation on biopharma capital formation.161 The failure rate
among startups receiving venture capital investments is high. Senator

Steven
Bradford),
http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/6-26-12TARP-Bradford.pdf.
158. Bradford, Promise Unfulfilled, supra note 17, at 222.
159. IAN COCKBURN & JOSH LERNER, THE COST OF CAPITAL FOR EARLY-STAGE
BIOTECHNOLOGY VENTURES, NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL ASSOCIATION 6 (Jul. 10, 2009)
(identifying several challenging features unique to biotech ventures: long marketing
timelines, illiquid assets, high levels of risk, and capital-intensive technology costs).
160. Id. Put differently, the high risk of a life sciences investment for a small amount
of venture capitalists drives up the cost of capital formation for the startup; see also
Biggest Biotech Trends of 2012, GENETIC ENGINEERING & BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWS, (Dec.
31, 2012), http://www.genengnews.com/insight-and-intelligence/biggest-biotech-trendsof-2012/77899744/. (stating that investors blame the decline in venture capital investment
in biotechnology in 2012, in part, on “biopharma startups’ greater risk than other techs”).
161. Stephanie Baum, The JOBS Act, crowdfunding and what it will mean for
healthcare
startups,
MEDCITY
NEWS
(Apr.
5,
2012),
http://medcitynews.com/2012/04/the-jobs-act-and-what-crowdfunding-will-mean-forhealthcare-startups/. (“With President Barack Obama signing the Jumpstart Our Business
Startups Bill into law today, the crowdfunding provision could mark a new era for
startups and make it easier to raise money with more investment from new investors who
fuel early and later-stage healthcare companies.”).
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Merkley has described the expectations of venture capitalist this way:
“Angel and venture capital funds, whose mission is to invest in the start-up
sector, tend to invest in perhaps one out of one hundred opportunities
presented and assume that ninety-five percent of investments will fail
entirely. Their profits commonly emerge out of only a handful of big
winners.”162 However, the fact that fewer than 1% of new drugs make it to
market may worry a small sliver of wealthy venture capitalists more than it
does a “crowd” of investors attracted to an idea through social media.163 In
other words, a venture capital firm, which assumes a large amount of
downside risk on all of its endeavors, may be far more concerned about the
statistical probabilities of the success of a new drug treatment than will a
group of low-dollar investors, representing an array of individual interests,
attracted through social media to that specific idea for a variety reasons.164
2. Decline in Biotechnology Venture Capital Investment May Reflect a
Funding Gap.
Recent trends further demonstrate that there is a venture capital funding
gap for biotechnology firms, particularly in the startup phase. The quarterly
MoneyTree Report measuring nationwide venture capital activity, published
by PricewaterhouseCoopers and the National Venture Capital Association,
shows a 13% decline in overall biotechnology venture capital funding from
$4.8 billion in 2011 to $4.2 billion in the 2012.165 The number of venture
capital-funded biotech deals has been steady over that time, with 472 deals
in 2011 and 480 in 2012.166
There are limitations to using this data as a measure of the potential for
crowdfunding, as it includes the investment activity primarily of
professional venture capital (“VC”) funds and venture subsidiaries of

162. 158 CONG. REC. S5476 (Jul. 26, 2012) (Stmt. Of Sen. Merkley (OR).
163. COCKBURN & LERNER, supra note 119 (Jun. 29, 2006) (noting that “fewer than
1% of drug candidates will make it to market”).
164. See, e.g., infra Part III.A.3 (discussing the motivations of crowdfunding investors
as distinguished from primarily profit-seeking venture capitalists).
165. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS/VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, MONEYTREE REPORT:
BIOTECHNOLOGY
INDUSTRY
HISTORICAL
TREND
DATA,
https://www.pwcmoneytree.com/MTPublic/ns/nav.jsp?page=historical
[hereinafter
MONEYTREE REPORT]. Data is provided by Thomson Reuters. The MoneyTree Report
is described by its collaborators as ”the only industry-endorsed research of its kind,” the
“definitive source of information on emerging companies that receive financing and the
venture capital firms that provide it,” and “a staple of the financial community,
entrepreneurs, government policymakers and the business press worldwide.”
166. Id.
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investment banks, as opposed to data from all private placements.167
However, the data provides some useful guidance on financing trends.
Particularly pertinent to the crowdfunding discussion is the critical funding
gap in the biotechnology startup phase.
Venture capital investment in the biotechnology “startup/seed” funding
stage decreased from $339 million in 2011 to $288 million in 2012,
representing a 15% drop, with a corresponding 18% decrease in the number
of VC-funded deals.168 These figures compare with $731 million invested in
140 deals in 2008 (averaging $5.2 million per deal), $735 million in 125
deals in 2009 (averaging $5.9 million), and $599 million in 110 deals for
2010 ($5.5 million).169 Notably, the average investment deal in the
startup/seed phase of biotechnology funding decreased from $5.9 million in
2009 to $4.3 million in 2013.170 In addition to a notable decrease in the
average investment, this range suggests that the $1 million annual cap on
crowdfunding offerings171 may not be a significant hindrance to capital
formation in biotechnology, at least for the startup phase.172
3. The Promise of Life Science Companies Concern Matters of the
Heart, Which May Attract Low Dollar Crowdfunding Investors.
Where a venture capitalist may avoid a life sciences startup, such as
Jimmy Lin’s Rare Genomics Institute, as a far-fetched and capital-intensive
genome sequencing project,173 large amounts of small investors may be less
risk averse, more attracted to the hopeful idea of the endeavor, and less

167. Id.,
Report
Definitions
and
Methodology,
available
at
https://www.pwcmoneytree.com/MTPublic/ns/nav.jsp?page=definitions#stage.
168. Venture capital funded deals in biotech decreased from 80 deals in 2011 to 66
deals in 2012. MONEYTREE REPORT, supra note 165 (defining parameters by
“Biotechnology” Industry and “Startup/Seed” Stage).
169. Id. Some of these figures have shifted over time with updates in the data, but the
downward trends have remained unaffected.
170. Id. (reflecting $176 million in only 41 over first three quarters of 2013). The
average investment per biotechnology deal, taken annually, for the other years are: $4.24
million in 2011 ($339 million in 08 startup/seed deals), $5.5 million in 2010 ($599
million in 110 deals), and $5.7 million in 2008 ($721 million in 127 deals). Id.
171. The JOBS Act exempts “transactions involving the offer or sale of securities by
an issuer . . . provided that,” inter alia “the aggregate amount sold to all investors by the
issuer, including any amount sold in reliance on the exemption provided under this
paragraph during the 12-month period preceding the date of such transaction, is not more
than $1,000,000.” Securities Act of 1933 § 4(6)(A), JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §
302(a), 126 Stat. 306, 315 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(A) (2012).
172. But see supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
173. Solomont, Rare Genomics, supra note 4.

2013]

Crowdfunding For Biotechs and the SEC’s Rule Proposal

159

concerned with an immediate return on their investments.174 Low dollar
investors may be more patient than “angel investors”175 or venture
capitalists, and more willing to provide seed money to such projects.176
For instance, consider the economics of capital formation for a Seattlebased biotechnology firm, Kineta.177 Though Kineta has not employed
crowdfunding, it has accumulated a diverse set of investors that include a
charitable foundation and a “string of small financing deals.”178 Kineta, a
multi-million dollar federal contract awardee,179 raised $11 million from
individual investors, the Iacocca Family Foundation, MPI Research, and
a group of 30 pharmaceutical executives, according to a company
representative.180 The Iacocca Family Foundation is run by a Chrysler
executive who lost his wife to diabetes, and he is particularly interested in
the work Kineta is doing to combat autoimmune disease, including type 1

174. Id.
175. For a discussion of the differences between an angel investor and a venture
capitalist, see Michael B. Farrrell, Angel Investors Flood The Tech Start-Up Scene, BOS.
GLOBE, (Mar. 17, 2013), http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2013/03/16/rise-angelinvestors/mjt8DYNxWj0bcShK4ElwhN/story.html.
176. Sara Hanks, Crowdcheck, Webinar: Crowdfunding for Entrepreneurs, RESEARCH
COMMERCIALIZATION
AND
SBIR
CENTER
(June
20,
2012),
http://center.ncet2.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=500&Itemid=8
7 (discussing advantages of crowdfunding over conventional funding options, such as
crowdfunding investors are likely to be more patient, there is flexibility to tailor financing
needs [debt v. equity], and geographic boundaries and social connections become less
determinative of access to capital).
177. See About Us, KINETA, http://www.kinetabio.com/aboutus.html.
178. Luke Timmerman, Playing for Bunt Singles, Builds a Biotech Company Without
VC Bucks,
XCONOMY.COM
(June
6,
2012),
http://www.xconomy.com/seattle/2012/06/06/kineta-playing-for-bunt-singles-builds-abiotech-company-without-vc-bucks/.
179. Luke Timmerman, Seattle’s Kineta Rakes in Half of $13M Federal Contract to
UW
For
Vaccine Boosters,
XCONOMY.COM
(Nov.
10,
2009),
http://www.xconomy.com/seattle/2009/11/10/seattles-kineta-rakes-in-half-of-13mfederal-contract-to-uw-for-vaccine-boosters/.
180. Press Release, Kineta, Inc., NIH-Funded Project to Develop Vaccine Immune
Boosters
University
of
Washington
(Nov.
10,
2009),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/11/10/idUS105167+10-Nov-2009+BW20091110;
Luke Timmerman, Kineta, Playing for Bunt Singles, Builds a Biotech Company Without
VC Bucks,
XCONOMY.COM
(June
6,
2012),
http://www.xconomy.com/seattle/2012/06/06/kineta-playing-for-bunt-singles-builds-abiotech-company-without-vc-bucks/; see also, NAT’L INST. HEALTH, DEVELOPMENT OF
KV1.3 CHANNEL BLOCKER SHK-186 AS A THERAPY FOR MULTIPLE SCLEROSIS,
http://projectreporter.nih.gov/project_info_description.cfm?aid=8053763&icde=1477517
4.
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diabetes.181 “The heart, it turns out, is a strong motivator,” and the nonprofit’s investment was reported to represent “an example of how
foundations are recasting the model of philanthropy” by making an equity
investment in promising companies in the hopes of advancing biotech
solutions, with “the potential for a double payoff if the company
succeeds.”182
This exemplifies the sort of endeavor that is likely to find crowdfunding
beneficial because, where matters of the heart are concerned, crowdfunding
investors, like charitable foundations, are more likely to carry the requisite
“patience to support lengthy clinical trials to determine whether” a given
drug works in humans.183 Thus, crowdfunding, where multiple low-dollar
investors undertake a cost-benefit investment calculus that is quite different
than that of risk-averse professional investors, has the capacity to
fundamentally alter the sometimes grim underlying economic dynamics of
capital formation for early stage life science endeavors. The dreaded
“Valley of Death”184 is easier to overcome with more time, patience, and
less risk aversion.
IV. THE POTENTIAL FOR HEIGHTENED FRAUD AMONG HEALTH CARE
ISSUERS.
A. Unique Risks for Small Cap Fraud Reminiscent of Penny Stock Scandals.
Many crowdfunding observers have warned of the heightened risk
involved in low-dollar investments of unsophisticated parties in small
businesses. The proposition has been described as “very risky” because
small businesses are usually illiquid, more likely to fail, and “[l]osses due to

181. Kristi Heim, Seattle Biotech Kineta Wins Over Heartfelt Funding, SEATTLE
TIMES, http://seattletimes.com/html/businesstechnology/2012042365_kineta07.html, (last
updated June 7, 2010, 11:30am) (“The Iacocca Family Foundation is investing in Kineta
to spur its efforts to develop the new drug, called ShK-186.”).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. The “Valley of Death” refers to the capital-intensive nature of the initial stage of
development for a startup company, which often includes extensive research and
development expenses, prior to the transition to marketing its products. See Evan Mills
and Jonathan Livingston, Traversing The Valley Of Death, FORBES (Nov. 17, 2005, 4:00
PM)
http://www.forbes.com/2005/11/17/utilities-emerging-techcz_1117energy_programs.html. In biotechnology, these early stage expenses can make
venture capitalists especially squeamish. See Deanna Pogoreic, The Biotech Valley Of
Death Has Become The Uncrossable Canyon, MEDCITY NEWS (Sept. 21, 2012, 10:42
AM),
http://medcitynews.com/2012/09/the-biotech-valley-of-death-has-become-theuncrossable-canyon-heres-one-innovative-approach-to-funding/.
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fraud and self-dealing are also much more likely.”185 This is the lesson, it is
argued, to be learned from the devastating outbreak of penny stock securities
fraud during the 1980s.186 Professor Bradford made this observation:
The abuses in the penny stock market in the 1980s “typify the
securities fraud potential associated with direct marketing of
microcap securities to individual investors.” The SEC’s experience
when it eased the requirements of the Rule 504 small offering
exemption in the 1990s also illustrates the potential fraud
associated with unregulated small offerings. The changes freed
Rule 504 offerings from federal mandatory disclosure
requirements even when those offerings were not registered at the
state level. In New York, which has no state registration
requirement, “Rule 504 was being used by nefarious promoters to
distribute up to $1 million of securities in New York to a select
favored group, followed promptly by boiler-room promotions that
artificially drove up the secondary market price until such time as
the initial purchasers could sell their shares at a handsome profit,
leaving the gullible crop of new investors with suddenly deflated
shares and irrecoverable losses.”187
Thomas Lee Hazen, a professor of law at the University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill, expresses similar apprehension:
Exposing unsophisticated investors to risky investments without
adequate disclosure unduly sacrifices investor-protection goals to
the perceived need to lower the disclosure barriers for small
businesses and crowdfunding techniques. The Internet and social
networking offer fertile ground for scammers. Scammers and
securities fraudsters have for nearly a century found ways to adapt
their scams to new technologies. Consider, for example, highpressure boiler room sales operations or the promotion of fictitious
or worthless securities to build Ponzi schemes. The Internet has
also proven to be fertile ground for pump and dump schemes.
Boiler room tactics have adapted to new technologies. For
example, telephonic cold calling has been supplemented or
superseded by spam emails. In other words, the benefits of
technology necessarily offer scammers new opportunities. The
Internet as a forum for crowdfunding thus does not by itself
warrant a special exemption. It is to be expected that absent
compliance with the crowdfunding exemption, the SEC will

185.
186.
187.

Bradford, Crowdfunding, supra note 50, at 105-06.
Id.
Id.
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vigorously pursue crowdfunding efforts without 1933 Act
registration.188
Senator Merkley warned in 2011:
[T]here are real risks of investment losses at a rate far beyond
ordinary investing. Crowdfunding, if done without proper
oversight, provides significant opportunity for fraud. Indeed, it
was not too long ago that our financial regulators were doing daily
battle with scam artists pitching huge returns on fraudulent
schemes through small, unregistered securities.189
B. Health Care Startups May Attract Bad Actors.
Some crowdfunding industry advocates downplay questions the JOBS Act
presents regarding the potential for fraud.190 This overlooks legitimate
concerns that the hopeful cyber atmosphere developing in the crowdfunding
community could combine with factors unique to health care to increase
investor risk exposure. Issuers selling securities over the internet based on
the promise of curing a rare disease, for instance, may attract a more
vulnerable subset of unsophisticated investors who are more willing to part
with their money for a good cause.191 The factors contributing to the success
of donation-based crowdfunding endeavors in health care may exacerbate
the risk of fraud in this sector for the equity-based crowdfunding model.
It is debatable whether the risk is higher for seniors, who are regarded as
an already-at-risk population by regulators and consumer groups.192 Seniors

188. Hazen, supra note 28, at 1767-68 (2012).
189. 157 Cong. Rec. S8458 (Dec. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Merkley).
190. See, e.g., Jason Best & Sherwood Neiss, Crowdfunding Delayed Again, Blasted
As A “Top Danger”, VENTUREBEAT (Aug. 22, 2012, 5:10 PM),
http://venturebeat.com/2012/08/22/crowdfunding-delayed-again-blasted-as-a-top-danger/
(claiming that “no cases of successful fraud have been discovered” in the United
Kingdom and Australia since crowdfunding was legalized there, and that, in donationbased crowdfunding in the U.S., “fraud has been caught rapidly, and always before funds
are distributed, as social network uncover the truth” thanks in part to “sophisticated
algorithms to detect fraud”).
191. Chuck Jaffe, JOBS Act Benefits Financial Criminals, MARKETWATCH.COM,
(Mar.
29,
2012),
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/jobs-act-benefits-financialcriminals-2012-03-29?pagenumber=2 (“The most promising startup in this new
environment might be a boiler-room pump-and-dump operation. . . . investors who are
too trusting in this environment will be the next legion of victims in financial frauds.”).
192. Edward Wyatt, Senate Delays Vote on Start-Ups Bill for 2 Amendments, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/22/business/senate-delaysvote-on-start-ups-bill-for-2-amendments.html (“Some Democrats, who made up all the
opposing votes to the bill, and consumer-advocacy organizations were less optimistic
about the effect of a law that rolls back regulations on corporate financial disclosure.
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are often the target of scam artists,193 but their engagement with
crowdfunding portals online through social media may be somewhat limited.
However, web use among senior citizens is increasing,194 and Internet-based
fraud can now combine with investment schemes, another pre-existing
vulnerability, to compound the concern.195
V. INVESTMENT LIMITS POSE COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS.
A. Investment Limits Are Among Investor Protection Measures.
Two key investor protection measures196 were included in the
CROWDFUND Act: (1) an individual limit on the amount an investor may
invest in any single crowdfunding venture (“single-issuer investment
limit”),197 and (2) a requirement that intermediaries ensure that such investor
not exceed his investment limits in the aggregate among all crowdfunding
ventures (“aggregate investment limit”).198
Pension funds, lobbying organizations like AARP and the chairwoman of the S.E.C. have
also opposed the bill.”).
193. Consumer Alert, Scammers Out to Profit on U.S. Supreme Court’s Ruling on the
Affordable
Care
Act,
FED.
TRADE
COMM’N
(July
2012),
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/alerts/alt047.shtm; see also Consumer Alert,
Health Care Scams Targeting Elderly, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (July 13,
2012) (“Federal and state authorities believe scammers will increasingly exploit news
about the recent health care ruling to target seniors, confuse and rip them off.”).
194. Fraud Target: Senior Citizens, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
http://www.fbi.gov/scams-safety/fraud/seniors (last visited Dec. 20, 2013) (“As web use
among senior citizens increases, so does their chances to fall victim to Internet fraud.”);
Facebook and YouTube Help the Edlerly Keep Their Brains Active and Reduce Stress
and Depression, DAILY MAIL REPORTER (Apr. 13, 2011) (“Facebook and YouTube help
the elderly keep their brains active and stave off memory loss, according to scientists. . .
‘Over the past few years the number of pensioners going online and using social
networks has increased by 80 per cent,’[Marco Trabucchi, chairman of the Italian
Association of Psychogeriatrics] added.”).
195. Top 10 Scams Targeting Seniors, NAT’L COUNCIL ON AGING,
http://www.ncoa.org/enhance-economic-security/economic-security-Initiative/savvysaving-seniors/top-10-scams-targeting.html
(listing
Healthcare/Medicare/Health
Insurance Fraud, Internet Fraud, and Investment Schemes as three of the top ten scams
targeting seniors),
196. While other measures exist, such as the issuer disclosure and investor education
requirements, this Comment argues that the statutory investment limits constitute the real
bright-line backstop designed to protect unwitting investors from squandering their
money over the Internet.
197. The Securities Act of 1933 § 4(6)(B)(i)-(ii), JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §
302(a), 126 Stat. 306, 315 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6)(B)(i)-(ii).
198. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(b), 126 Stat. § 4A(a)(8), 126 Stat. 306,
316 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(8)).
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Originally, Republicans in Congress drafted bills in the House which
“failed to contain any meaningful investor protections” for crowdfunding.199
These “bare bones” bills,200 one of which passed by a bipartisan and
overwhelming majority in the House with the support of the White House,201
would have allowed any individual to invest, and lose, up to $10,000 or 10%
of his income, whichever was less.202 A $10,000 total investment cap would
have been inappropriately high.203 The version passing the House also
stated that “an issuer or intermediary may rely on certifications as to annual
income provided by the person to whom the securities are sold to verify the
investor’s income.”204 As is outlined in Part V.B below, this standard
prevailed with the SEC Staff in its Proposed Crowdfunding Rule, but at the
time of the bill’s drafting, the Senate removed this self-verification language
from the House version.205

199. Hazen, supra note 28 at 1750; Robb Mandelbaum, Which Crowdfunding Bill Will
It Be? N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 27, 2012), http://boss.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/27/whichcrowdfunding-bill-will-it-be/ (observing that “[o]pportunities to defraud unsuspecting
investors . . . may be vast if the House version of the bill survives.”).
200. Hazen, supra note 28 at 1750 (2012).
201. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, The American
Jobs Act (Sept. 8 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/08/factsheet-and-overview (“The administration also supports establishing a “crowdfunding”
exemption from SEC registration requirements for firms raising less than $1 million (with
individual investments limited to $10,000 or 10% of investors’ annual income.)”).
202. Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act, H.R. 2930 112th Cong. § 2(a) (2011), (as
amended and passed by the House, Nov. 3, 2011) (House lawmakers voting 407-17 to
add a new exception, § 4(6), to the Securities Act of 1933, provided that “(B) the
aggregate amount sold to any investor in reliance on this exemption within the previous
12-month period does not exceed the lesser of (i) $10,000 . . . [or] “(ii) 10 percent of such
investor’s income”), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr2930eh/pdf/BILLS112hr2930eh.pdf; see also Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, H.R. 3606 112th Cong.
§ 301 (2012) (as passed by House, Mar. 8, 2012); see also Mandelbaum, supra note 199
(“Under the terms of the House bill . . . [e]ach investor would be limited to $10,000 or 10
percent of annual income, whichever is less.”).
203. Bradford, Crowdfunding, supra note 50, at 130 (“The $10,000 individual limit in
some of the proposals seems excessive; it is doubtful whether most investors could afford
an annual loss of that magnitude.”).
204. The JOBS Act, H.R. 3606 112th Cong. § 301(b)(2012) (as amended and passed
by
the
House,
March
2012),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS112hr3606eh/pdf/BILLS-112hr3606eh.pdf; see Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act, H.R.
2930, 112th Cong.§ 2(b)(2011) (as Introduced in House) (proposing to add §4A(c) to the
Securities Act of 1933).
205. 158 CONG. REC. S1884 (Mar. 21, 2012) (proposing amendment to H.R. 3606, the
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act); see also 158 CONG. REC. S1806 (Mar. 19, 2012)
(proposing SA 1884 ”strik[ing] title III” of H.R. 3606 and inserting new text).
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The Senate sensibly responded by adopting a lower single-issuer
investment limit,206 and by adding a provision requiring intermediaries to
make efforts to ensure that investors not exceed these same investment limits
on the aggregate among all crowdfunding ventures.207 As adopted, the
CROWDFUND Act limits any individual investor with an annual income or
net worth below $100,000 to a maximum investment of the greater of $2,000
per year or 5% of annual income or net worth.208 Investors with an income
or net worth over $100,000 could invest up to 10% of their annual income or
net worth, up to a maximum of $100,000.209 The Proposed Crowdfunding
Rule resolves the ambiguity presented in the statutory language under
circumstances where an investor’s net worth is below $100,000 but annual
income is above $100,000 (or vice versa).210
For investors with an income or net worth above $100,000, the investor is
limited to an investment of 10 percent of her income or net worth over a 12month period, not to exceed $100,000.211 Because the above limits could
subject an investor with a net worth above $100,000 but an income of less
than $100,000 (or vice versa) to technically two investment limits, the SEC
Staff resolved that the greater limit would apply.212 Thus, an investor with
an annual income of $150,000 but a net worth of $60,000 would be able to
invest up to $15,000 (10% of his income) in crowdfunding ventures in a 12month period. This has been referred to as the “single-issuer investment
limit.”213 On the morning of the Commission vote on the proposed rule,
SEC Commissioner Stein expressed concern about permitting the greater
investment amount, commenting that “even with primary residences
excluded from the calculation, I remain concerned that taking the ‘greater
than’ approach may expose seniors or others to risks and losses they cannot
afford.”214

206. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(6)(B)(i)-(ii), JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §
302(a), 126 Stat. 306, 315 (codified at 15 U.S.C. Section 77d(6)(B)(i)-(ii)).
207. Securities Act of 1933 § 4A(a)(8), JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(a), 126
Stat. 306, 316 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §77d(a)(8) (2012)).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. 78 Fed Reg. at 66,433 (“If either annual income or net worth exceeds $100,000,
then a limit of 10 percent of annual income or net worth, whichever is greater, but not to
exceed $100,000, would apply.”).
211. Securities Act of 1933 § 4A(a)(6)(B), 126 Stat. 306, 315 (2012) (codified at 15
U.S.C. §77d(6)(B)).
212. 78 Fed Reg. at 66,433.
213. Bradford, Promise Unfulfilled, supra note 17, at 200.
214. SEC Comm’r Kara Stein, Statement Regarding the Proposing Release on
Crowdfunding
(Oct.
23,
2013),
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370540008723#.Ur4WeBZU1G4/.
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Indeed, these two provisions, the single-issuer investment limit and
aggregate investment limits, now enshrined in the federal securities laws as
15 U.S.C. §§ 77d(a)(6)(B) and 77d-1(a)(8), respectively, deserve
significantly more attention than the SEC gave them in its proposed rule.215
For instance, although the limits are related, there is a key distinction
between them and how they impact the exemption. “An investor’s violation
of th[e] aggregate limit would affect the exemption differently than an
investor’s violation of the single-issuer limit.”216 Since the availability of a
section 4(6) exemption is based on the condition that an issuer not sell shares
to an investor in excess of the investor’s limit for that issuer (i.e. the singleissuer limit), if any one investor exceeds his investment threshold for that
single issuer then the exemption is lost for that issuer.217 However, the
exemption is not conditioned on all investors staying below their overall
aggregate limit, but only on the statutory mandate that an intermediary take
such steps to ensure that investors not exceed that aggregate limit.218 Thus,
if an investor did in fact exceed his investment limits by having invested too
much with multiple issuers, the exemption is not lost for all of those issuers,
so long as the relevant intermediaries satisfied their burdens to ensure that
the investor had not exceed his aggregate limits.219
Thus, of particular regulatory concern is the intermediary burden to
“ensure” compliance with the aggregate investment limit.220 Section 4A(a)
of Title III states that intermediaries must “make such efforts as the
Commission determines appropriate, by rule, to ensure that no investor in a
12-month period has purchased securities offered pursuant to section 4(6)
that, in the aggregate, from all issuers, exceed the investment limits set forth
in section 4(6)(B).”221 This places an affirmative duty on the funding
portals/intermediaries to “ensure that no investor” exceeds the statutory
limits on his annual crowdfunding investments, but it was unclear at the time
of the statute’s passage precisely what would be expected of intermediaries

215. The Proposed Crowdfunding Rule is brief in its rationale discussing selfverification of investor income and aggregate investments, taking up less than a page of
the Federal Register. 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,469-70.
216. Bradford, Promise Unfulfilled, supra note 17, at 202 (emphasis added).
217. Id. (“If an issuer sells more to an investor than the single-issuer limit allows, the
exemption would be lost; section 4(6)(B) conditions the exemption on the amount sold to
the investor not exceeding the limit.”).
218. Securities Act of 1933 § 4A(a)(8), 126 Stat. 306, 316 (2012) (codified as 15
U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(8)).
219. Bradford, Promise Unfulfilled, supra note 17, at 202 (emphasis added).
220. Id. at 201-02.
221. Securities Act of 1933 § 4A(a)(8), JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(b), 126
Stat. 306 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(8)) (emphasis added).
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to carry out this obligation.222 The following two sections explore the
Proposed Crowdfunding Rule’s recommended resolution to this compliance
issue, investor self-verification, and its advantages and disadvantages.
B. SEC Crowdfunding Rule Proposal Details Liability of Intermediaries and
Their Duty to “Ensure” Investment Limits.
1. Intermediaries May Rely on Investors, and Issuers May Rely on
Intermediaries.
Since the passage of the statute, legal experts and commenters have
suspected that enforcing the aggregate investment limits would prove
difficult.223 Section 4A(a) of the CROWDFUND Act requires intermediaries to “make such efforts as the Commission determines appropriate,
by rule, to ensure that no investor in a 12-month period has purchased
securities offered pursuant to section 4(6) that, in the aggregate, from all
issuers, exceed the investment limits set forth in in section 4(6)(B).”224 Of
course, as already detailed, Section 4(6)(B) sets forth the single-issuer
investment limits.225 Thus, since Section 4(6)(B)(i) limits the investments of
individuals earning less than $100,000 per year to the greater of $2,000 or
5% of investor net worth or income,226 the aggregate investment limit found
in Section 4A(a)(8) is identical to the single-issuer investment cap.
To enforce compliance with these two provisions, the Proposed
Crowdfunding Rule allows intermediaries to rely on an investor’s
representations concerning his annual income, net worth, and his aggregate
amount invested through other crowdfunding-exempt intermediaries.227 To
this end, the SEC proposed “Regulation Crowdfunding,” which would, in
part, create 17 C.F.R. §§ 227.100(a)(2)228 & 227.303(b).
Section
227.100(a)(2) memorializes in the Code of Federal Regulations the statutory
222. Bradford, Promise Unfulfilled, supra note 17, at 202 (“It is unclear what the SEC
will require intermediaries to do to enforce this aggregate limit.”).
223. See, e.g., 158 CONG. REC. S5476 (Jul. 26, 2012) (remarks by Sen. Merkley)
(“Some have expressed concern about how to implement the aggregate amounts across
platforms.”); see also Hazen, supra note 28 (observing that aggregate investment limits
“could be difficult to enforce if the investor uses multiple crowdfunding sites.”);
Bradford, Promise Unfulfilled, supra note 17, at 202 (“It is unclear what the SEC will
require intermediaries to do to enforce this aggregate limit.”).
224. Securities Act of 1933 § 4A(a)(8), JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(b), 126
Stat. 306, 316 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(8)).
225. See supra notes 197 and 213 and accompanying text.
226. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(6)(B)(i), JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(b),
126 Stat. 306, 315 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(i)).
227. 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,470.
228. Id. at 66,551.
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§ 4(a)(6) single-issuer investment limits, while § 227.303(b) implements §
4A(a)(8) of the Securities Act of 1933.
The SEC noted in Instruction 3 to paragraph §227.100(a)(2) that issuers
may rely on the efforts of intermediaries:
An issuer offering and selling securities in reliance on Section
4(a)(6) . . . may rely on the efforts an intermediary is required to
undertake pursuant to § 227.303(b) to ensure that the aggregate
amount of securities purchased by an investor in offerings
pursuant to Section 4(a)(6) of the Securities Act will not cause the
investor to exceed the limit set forth in Section 4(a)(6) of the
Securities Act and § 227.100(a)(2), provided that the issuer does
not know that the investor had exceeded the investor limits or
would exceed the investor limits as a result of purchasing
securities in the issuer’s offering.229
This presumably would allow an issuer to retain the crowdfunding
exemption under circumstances where an investor in actuality exceeds his
limits but where the intermediary complies with proposed § 227.303(b),
unless the issuer otherwise knows that the investor is unqualified to make
the investment. Section 227.303(b) is the key provision implementing the
Staff’s self-certification standard, because it requires only that an
intermediary “have a reasonable basis for believing that the investor satisfies
the investment limitations” established by § 4(a)(6)(B) of the 1933 Act, and
that, crucially, the intermediary can establish such reasonable basis belief by
relying on the investor’s representations.230 These two provisions combined,
then, allow for an issuer to rely on the assurances that its investors provide to
the intermediary in order to retain the exemption, even if the investor
misleads the intermediary and exceeds his income-based or aggregate
investment limitations.
One reason the SEC Staff found persuasive in reaching its conclusion that
a self-verification standard is the most appropriate is that, “it would be
difficult for intermediaries to monitor or independently verify whether each
investor remains within his or her investment limits for each particular
offering in which he or she intends to participate.”231 The Staff pointed to
three comment letters complaining about this issue.232 One letter said that
“unless the SEC offers some sort of very simple clearinghouse for tracking

229. Id. at 66,551.
230. Id. at 66,557.
231. Id. at 66,470.
232. Id. at 66,469 (citing Cera Technology Comment Letter, infra note 233;
Crowdfunding Offerings Comment Letter, infra note 238; and Schwartz Comment Letter,
infra note 234).
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investors nationwide, I think a portal can’t be expected to track investments
made on other, competing portals.”233 However, another source, University
of Colorado Professor Schwartz’s comment letter, described the
CROWDFUND Act’s annual investment cap as a bedrock statutory
protection for crowdfunding investors,234 arguing that:
It may not be enough, for instance, for intermediaries to simply
ask investors whether they have reached their annual limit and
leave it at that, as crowdfunding investors might not remember or
keep records of their past investments. Nor can intermediaries rely
solely on their own internal records, as the cap is an aggregate one
for all crowdfunding securities purchased on any platform and
from any issuer. How exactly to regulate intermediaries’ policing
of the annual cap is a difficult and complex matter that deserves
careful attention by the SEC. Modern information technology may
make it possible to enforce the cap at very low cost, even across
different crowdfunding platforms. But even if the cost of
effectively enforcing this cap turns out to be a bit high, it is
probably worth it, because the whole statutory scheme depends on
it.235
Given these observations, it may come as a surprise to the Professor that
the main takeaway the SEC drew from his comment letter was that, because
“it will be difficult” for intermediaries to track investor activity with various
other portals, a self-certification standard is therefore the best option.236
Indeed, he seemed to argue the opposite.237 The third source wrote: “For all
the brokers and funding portals to know this [aggregate investment]
information, the Commission would have to collect this data and maintain it,
on a real-time basis, for electronic access and search by brokers and funding
portals.”238

233. Letter from Michael Mace, CEO of Cera Technology to SEC and Comment on
SEC Regulatory Initiatives Under JOBS Act: Title III, at 2 (Apr. 13, 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-iii/jobstitleiii-10.pdf.
234. Letter from Andrew A. Schwartz, Associate Professor of Law at University of
Colorado, to SEC and Comment on Regulatory Initiatives Under JOBS Act: Title III
(Jun.
13,
2013),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-iii/jobstitleiii-240.pdf
(excerpting his own law review article as a response: Keep it Light, Chairman White:
SEC Rulemaking Under the CROWDFUND Act, 66 VAND. L. REV. 43 (2013)).
235. Id.
236. 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,469.
237. Schwartz, Keep it Light, supra note 234, at 59.
238. Letter from Marshall Neel, Esq., Co-Founder of Crowdfunding Offerings, Ltd.,
to SEC and Comment on Regulatory Initiatives Under JOBS Act: Title III, (May 11,
2012), http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-iii/jobstitleiii-60.htm.
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The SEC concedes that relying on a centralized database could “help
provide an intermediary with a reasonable basis for a conclusion” that an
investor is qualified, but notes that no such database currently exists.239
Instead, the Staff seems to envision a “check the box” system where
intermediaries create the functionality on their websites prompting investors
to disclose their annual income, net worth, and their total investments in
other intermediary platforms over the past 12 months.240 Unless the
intermediary had information within its control, like for instance, that
particular investor’s investment levels in another issuer on the platform, the
intermediary will have satisfied its statutory burden by relying on the
assurances of investors.
2. Intermediaries May Be Liable for Fraud Committed by Issuers.
The SEC took a significant position on the issue of intermediary liability
under the CROWDFUND Act that is worth noting. Section 4A(c)(3) of the
Securities Act of 1933 now defines, for purposes of liability under Section
4A generally, an issuer as any “person who offers or sells the security in
such offering.”241 Section 4A(c)(1)(A) permits an investor to bring an action
against “an issuer” to recover consideration paid for a crowdfunding-exempt
security or for damages if the issuer make an untrue statement of material
fact or omitted a material fact required in order to make the statements not
misleading.242 The SEC staff found that, on the basis of the definition found
in section 4A(c)(3), “it appears likely that intermediaries, including funding
portals, would be considered issuers for purposes of this liability
provision.”243 Thus, the SEC Staff seems to suggest that if a startup
company provides an intermediary/funding portal with materially false
offering documents and then disappears with investors’ money, then the
investor could bring an action against the other “issuer” involved—the
intermediary.244 The Staff hints that liability for making an untrue statement
of material fact would be implicated only if the portal failed to conduct an
adequate review of the offering documents to uncover the fraud, but it is
unclear if the mere posting of fraudulent documents would alone implicate
the liability section.

239. 78 Fed. Reg. at 66, 470.
240. Id.
241. Securities Act of 1933 §4A(c)(3), JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(b), 126
Stat. 306, 319 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(c)(3)).
242. Securities Act of 1933 §§4A(c)(1)(A) & 4A(c)(2)(A), JOBS Act, Pub. L. No.
112-106, § 302(b), 126 Stat. 306, 318-19 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d-1(c)(1)(A)
& 77d-1(c)(2)(A)).
243. 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,499 (Nov. 5, 2013).
244. Id.
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C. Self-Verification: Advantages and Disadvantages of Relying on Investor
Assurances.
The Commission took a hands-off approach to both the single-issuer
investment limits found in section 4(6) and the aggregate investment limits
compelled by section 4A(a)(8), as it did in the August 2012 Proposed Rule
lifting the general solicitation ban. The SEC proposes that issuers and
intermediaries can depend on the voluntary disclosure by the investors of
their income and net worth and aggregate investment levels.245 This result
was likely a relief to intermediaries who may have feared the prospect of
having to independently verify the total purchases of a given investor
through other funding portals.246 However, since issuers are relying on the
methods of intermediaries, who are in turn relying on the assurances of
investors, it is worth considering whether this “trust me” structure satisfies
the Congressional intent of the investment limitations, and whether the risks
of self-certification are too high or uncertain.
1. Does Self-Certification Satisfy Congressional Intent?
A self-certification method to satisfy the aggregate investment levels,
where an intermediary trusts the word of the investors regarding their
investments with other funding portals, arguably does not capture the spirit
of Congress’s inclusion of the word “ensure.”247 Senator Merkley outlined
clearly that individual and aggregate caps serve as key investor protection
measures in the CROWDFUND Act.248 He said in July 2012: “Without
aggregate caps, someone could in theory max out a per-company investment
in a single company and then repeat that bet ten, a hundred, or a thousand
times, perhaps unintentionally wiping out their entire savings.”249 Sen.
Merkley referred to the single-issuer investment limit as “an important
investor protection” for low-income earners, and warned against adopting a
“checking a box” method in order to “protect less sophisticated investors
from opting into the higher limits accidentally or due to potentially
misleading promptings from a less scrupulous intermediary.”250

245. 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,551 (proposing 17 C.F.R. 227.100).
246. See, e.g., Crowdfunding Offerings Comment Letter, supra note 238 (noting the
difficulty of crowdfunding portals to track the activity of investors using multiple
intermediaries).
247. Securities Act of 1933 § 4A(a)(8), JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(b), 126
Stat. 306, 316 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(8)).
248. 158 Cong. Record S5476 (Jul. 26, 2012).
249. Id.
250. Id.
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In fact, statutory provisions that were part of the original House versions
of the crowdfunding exemption allowing for an issuer or intermediary to rely
on investor certifications as to annual income251 were removed from the
Senate versions. The House bills stated: “For purposes of section 4(6), an
issuer or intermediary may rely on certifications as to annual income
provided by the person to whom the securities are sold to verify the
investor’s in come.”252 Since the House bill contained no aggregate caps,253
there was no corresponding language permitting an intermediary to rely on
an investor’s assurances regarding crowdfunding investments through other
portals.
On March 21, 2012, Majority Leader Senator Harry Reid (D-NV) agreed
to allow an amendment to replace the House crowdfunding bill contained in
the JOBS ACT, saying:
This amendment will ensure that watchdogs are in place to protect
the small investors and their money from fraudulent companies
and abuse of the system. People are lurking out there waiting for
ways to cheat. I am sorry, but it is true. These are people who are
either amoral or immoral, looking for opportunities to make
money. . . . It is an important amendment, and it is so important to
improving this bill.254
The next day, when the JOBS Act came to the floor of the U.S. Senate,
Senators Merkley, Brown, and Bennet introduced Senate Amendment
1884255 to replace Congressman McHenry’s crowdfunding language,256 the
latter of which allowed for self-verification. Sen. Merkley did not list the
self-certification language as one of the seven key distinctions that he
outlined between his amendment and the House bill.257 However, the
Senator did note that the House version contained “no aggregate caps,”
meaning that “a person could lose their entire life savings in one fell

251. The JOBS Act, H.R. 3606 112th Cong. § 301(b) (2012) (as amended and passed
by
the
House
in
March
2012),
at
31:24-32:3,
available
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr3606eh/pdf/BILLS-112hr3606eh.pdf;
Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act, H.R. 2930, 112th Cong. § 2(b) (2011) (as Introduced
in House) (proposing to add §4A(c) to the Securities Act of 1933).
252. Id.
253. See infra notes 257-63 and accompanying text.
254. 158 CONG. REC. S1884 (Mar. 21, 2012).
255. Senate Amendment 1884, 112th Cong. (2012); see also 158 CONG. REC. S1884
(Mar. 21, 2012).
256. 158 CONG. REC. S1884 (Mar. 21, 2012) (proposing amendment to H.R. 3606, the
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act); see also 158 Cong. Rec. S1806 (Mar. 19, 2012)
(proposing SA 1884” strik[ing] title III” of H.R. 3606 and inserting new text).
257. 158 CONG. REC. S1886-S1888 (Mar. 21, 2012).
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swoop.”258 He said the Senate version set aggregate caps “so we don’t end
up with folks who are on public services because they were swindled out of
everything they had.”259 The day of the vote, Sen. Merkley described the
House bill as “a pathway to predatory scams” because of lack of issuer
transparency and it “allows companies to hire people to pump the stocks.”260
Senate Amendment 1884 passed 64-35.261 Thus, the House crowdfunding
bill’s self-certification language was explicitly omitted in the final Senate
bill that was signed into law.
Although the self-verification standard for annual income was not
discussed at length on the Senate floor, Sen. Merkley certainly did not seem
to contemplate self-verification as an option. In addition to discouraging a
“check-the-box” approach to the single-issuer investment cap for those
seeking to make larger investments, citing investor protection,262 Sen.
Merkley stated:
Some have expressed concern about how to implement the
aggregate amounts across platforms. A data sharing regime is one
way to do that, but the SEC might also consider whether to pair it
with a presumption that ordinary investors that remain within an
amount below the default aggregate, for example $500, on any one
platform are also presumed compliant across other unaffiliated
platforms. This streamlining may be particularly useful for those
seeking to make small investments and for those that want to
engage in community-based crowdfunding.263
It seems fair to say that any sort of “data sharing regime” among the
intermediaries resembles something more like a centralized database, or at
the very least is clearly distinct from the permitting of investors to selfcertify as the SEC staff has proposed. The Senator envisioned some degree
of a heightened duty on behalf of the intermediaries, beyond the mere
assurances of investors.
Further, consider the similarities between Title II and Title III of the JOBS
Act. As stated previously, Title II of the JOBS Act requires issuers to “take
reasonable steps to verify” that purchasers are accredited investors,264 while
Title III requires that intermediaries “make such efforts as the Commission
determines appropriate, by rule, to ensure” that investors do not exceed their

258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

158 CONG. REC S1887 (Mar. 21, 2012).
Id.
158 CONG. REC. S1976 (Mar. 22, 2012) (introducing Senate Amendment 1884).
158 CONG. REC S1976 (Mar. 22, 2012).
158 Cong. Rec. S5476 (Jul. 26, 2012).
158 Cong. Rec. S5476 (Jul. 26, 2012).
JOBS Act § 201(a)(1).
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limits.265 The requirement that intermediaries “ensure” that aggregate
investment limits are not exceeded is analogous to the burden on issuers
taking advantage of the general solicitation rule to take reasonable steps to
ensure that purchasers are accredited.266 One wonders why the SEC had not
considered the statutory burdens—one on issuers to “verify” that purchasers
are accredited for the sake of the new general solicitation exemption, and the
other on intermediaries to “ensure” investor qualification for the
crowdfunding exemption—to be essentially the same.
2. Investor Risk.
It is simple to overstate the worries of self-certification. After all,
investors are their own best advocates, and are responsible for their own
decisions with their money. However, at the very least the SEC should craft
a rule that minimizes intermediary uncertainty and investor risk. The handsoff approach to intermediary enforcement is understandable, but it carries
risks that the financial incentives of self-verification harms, if not erases, the
intent of the investment limitations as a meaningful investor protection
measure. The worry is that there could be a cascade of misrepresentations
by investors, intentional or not, that could tarnish the marketplace with
stories of low-income earners losing more than they should have had
invested.
It seems that self-certification could carry with it a predictable unchecked
chain of incentives that has produced undesirable market outcomes in
similar contexts.267 Consider, for example, the role that the mortgage
servicing industry played in the housing bubble precipitating the 2008-2009
financial crisis, where economic incentives and information gaps in the
securitization market facilitated collusion among loan officers and fraud

265. JOBS Act §302(b) (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(8)).
266. See Sara Hanks, JOBS Act Crowdfunding Provisions Await Clarification by SEC,
44 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 37, 1712 (Sept. 17, 2012) (positing that the SEC’s August
2012 general solicitation proposal may be indicative of SEC rulemaking on
crowdfunding intermediary’s compliance with investment limits); but see Freeman
White, SEC Gives Hints on Equity Crowdfunding, LAUNCHT BLOG (June 21, 2012),
http://www.launcht.com/blog/2012/06/21/sec-gives-hints-on-equity-crowdfunding/
(explaining that “the SEC was leaning towards the use of a central database for verifying
aggregate annual investment amounts instead of taking the investor’s word for it” at a
June 2012 rulemaking meeting).
267. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N REPORT, NAT’L COMM’N ON THE CAUSES OF
THE FIN. & ECON. CRISIS IN THE US, FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N 161 (2011),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf
[hereinafter
FCIC
REPORT] (describing “[l]ax or practically non-existent government oversight” in the
housing mortgage servicing industry creating what criminologists label “‘crimefacilitative environments,’ where crime could thrive.”).
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among homeowners.268 Here, optimistic crowdfunding investors may
attempt to maximize their investment and expected return by
misrepresenting their income and/or crowdfunding aggregate investment
levels with other funding portals to a third party validator,269 just as
unqualified aspiring homeowners did during the housing bubble.270
Meanwhile, intermediaries could insulate themselves from liability by
arguing that they fulfilled their obligation by reasonably relying on third
party validators, which presumably would earn fees for their services, to
“ensure” that aggregate investor limits were being followed. Similarly, a
lender (i.e. the third party validator) who originates a mortgage earns a
commission for each sale but lacks a long-term stake in whether the
mortgage is paid, “beyond the lender’s own business reputation,” and the
firm packaging the mortgages into mortgage-backed securities (i.e. the
intermediary) also lacks the financial stake of the purchaser (the issuer).271
Everyone seems to win—the loan applicant gets a home, the crowdfunding
investor a stake in the issuer’s company—but, if both were unqualified from
the start, the result is a foreclosed home or a broke investor (and potentially
lost crowdfunding exemption for the issuer, if the single-issuer limit is
breached).272
3. Market Uncertainty.
Although self-verification is a more workable standard for intermediaries,
it arguably comes at the cost of not only increased investor risk but also
market uncertainty. For instance, some have argued that self-supplied
income information could “be intentionally or unintentionally incorrect.”273
Could investors have a claim against intermediaries for not failing to
“ensure” compliance with investment limit overall, even if the investor
misrepresented his income or net worth? The SEC staff does not

268. Id. at 160-65.
269. Professor Bradford observed, when criticizing the original House Bill 2930 and
its single issuer income-based investment standard, that “[i]nvestors who want to invest
more would quickly learn to exaggerate their income.” Bradford, Crowdfunding, supra
note 50, at 128.
270. FCIC REPORT, supra note 267, at 160 (citing the role of “a borrower’s lying or
intentionally omitting information on a loan application” in rampant housing fraud).
271. FCIC REPORT, supra note 267, at 165 (giving example of economically
destructive incentives, where “the lender who originated the mortgage for sale, earning a
commission . . . had no long-term stake in whether the mortgage was paid, beyond the
lender’s own business reputation. The securitizer who packaged mortgages into
mortgage-backed securities, similarly, was less likely to retain a stake in those
securities.”).
272. See supra notes 216-22 and accompanying text.
273. Bradford, Promise Unfulfilled, supra note 17, at Part III.c.ii.
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forthrightly address the potential for investor misrepresentation in the
Proposed Crowdfunding Rule,274 but stated that “[t]he intermediary could
not rely on an investor’s representations if the intermediary had reason to
question the reliability of the representation.”275 In other words, if an
investor had already purchased Section 4(a)(6)-exempt crowdfunding
securities through that intermediary, then it would not be reasonable for the
intermediary to fail to track or otherwise ignore that amount purchased for
purposes of other crowdfunding investments; the intermediaries are expected
to reasonably track investor activity on their own internal systems.276
Regardless, courts and the Enforcement Division of the SEC is unlikely to
be sympathetic to actions by investors against intermediaries for damages or
rescission where the investors made misrepresentations.
Analogous
circumstances exist where investors have claimed to have been accredited at
the time of transactions but subsequently disavowed those assurances in
order to sue under the federal securities laws, and federal courts have been
unsympathetic.277
Additionally, an issuer loses the crowdfunding exemption for the entire
equity or debt offering in the event that an intermediary fails to adequately
ensure that a lone investor stays within his aggregate investment limit. In
that case, is there liability of the intermediary to the issuer?
It is unclear, but the chief concern is not necessarily the issue of liability
for fraud, but rather that investor misrepresentations of their qualifications
could pervade the business. Lack of adequate enforcement of investor
qualifications could undermine the statute’s purpose by deteriorating
investor confidence in small issuers. Some have noted that “a self-certified
income standard is essentially the same as no standard at all,” and the same
logic can be applied to aggregate investment levels.278
In any case, there is certainly the potential that the SEC Staff may
reconsider its proposed rules in light of responses it receives throughout the
comment period. As discussed above, the SEC originally had proposed a
similarly hands-off approach to its first general solicitation proposal with
respect to an investor’s status as an accredited investor.279 The usefulness of

274. 78 Fed. Reg. 66,470 (Nov. 5, 2013).
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. See 77 Fed. Reg. at 54,464 (citing Wright v. Nat’l Warranty Co., 953 F.2d 256
(6th Cir. 1991), Goodwin Props., LLC v. Acadia Group, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9975 (D. Me. 2001), and Faye L. Roth Revocable Trust v. UBS Painewebber Inc., 323 F.
Supp. 2d 1279 (S.D. Fla. 2004)).
278. Bradford, Crowdfunding, supra note 50, at 128.
279. Sara Hanks, Crowdcheck.com Memo, New Rule 506(c): General Solicitation in
Regulation D Offerings, (Sept. 5, 2012) (“The SEC declined to specify even a non-
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a facts and circumstances approach was questioned by some securities law
practitioners as an ambiguous standard and too vague to be effective,280 so
the SEC responded with a non-exclusive list of verification methods in its
final rule. Hopefully the Staff will respond to similar concerns of
misrepresentations by crowdfunding investors in its final rule by suggesting
that: the questions asked of investors by intermediaries about net worth,
income, and aggregate investments be sufficiently detailed; that investor
responses be accompanied by a sworn pledge of truthfulness; and that
intermediaries disclose the potential for investor liability for untruthfulness
(in, for instance, an administrative action by the SEC).
D. SEC Rejects Calls for a Centralized Database, Which Would Be Safest,
But Potentially Cost-Prohibitive Option to Enforce Aggregate Investment
Limit.
At the end of the day, the only way for an intermediary truly to “ensure”
investor compliance would be to create a “central recordkeeping system”
that all intermediaries could share.281 Such a centralized system could
ideally be created and staffed by either the Commission itself282 or some
(sole) third party verification service with the blessing of the SEC. This was
the path recommended by the Massachusetts state-level securities
regulator283 and others. Before the passage of the JOBS Act, one commenter
outlined his vision for an SEC-run crowdfunding regime this way:
Under such a setup, the SEC would own the central database of
crowdfunding offerers, investors, and transactions. The SEC
would therefore have the identities, financial account info, digital
signatures, etc. of all market participants, and would initiate all
movements of funds through its own system. This would grant the
SEC full knowledge of and control over this market, allowing it to
program red flags, investigate abuses, and shut down transactions

exclusive list of such methods” that the SEC would consider “reasonable steps to verify”
that the purchasers are accredited).
280. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
281. Bradford, Promise Unfulfilled, supra note 17, at 202 (stating that the “only
totally effective solution would be to establish a central recordkeeping system”).
282. See Letter from Paul Spinrad to SEC and Comment on Regulatory Initiative
Under JOBS Act: Title III (Jul. 26, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-titleiii/jobstitleiii-114.pdf.
283. Letter from William Francis Galvin, Sec’y of Commonwealth of Mass. to SEC
and Comment on SEC Regulatory Initiatives Under JOBS Act: Title III, at 3 (Aug. 8,
2012), http://www.sec.state.ma.us/sct/sctpdf/Jobs_Act0001.pdf (stating that “the
Commission should require intermediaries to share information about who has invested
in these offerings and the amounts of their investments”).
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and users as needed, without approvals or cooperation from any
other entity.284
A centralized system would benefit intermediaries because a single,
integrated database could contain both verifiable proof of investor income
and net worth (i.e. federal tax returns) and investor investment status with
other intermediaries in a form accessible to the multitude285 of
intermediaries.286 In 2012, there were indications that the SEC was “leaning
towards the use of a central database for verifying aggregate annual
investment amounts instead of taking the investor’s word for it,”287 so
perhaps the debate is still alive among the Staff.
Given the other options, a non-profit, government-run clearinghouse could
eliminate the risks of various market participants competing for customers
and information. The existence of various unknown verification services
across the spectrum of crowdfunding288 could serve as a deterrent to investor
participation because of a lack of trust. From an investor’s perspective, if all
that is known about an issuer is that which can only be read in cyberspace on
an intermediary’s social media platform, providing a new third party
sensitive documents demonstrating proof of income or about their
crowdfunding investments may pose a risk outweighing potential investment
returns. The Commission should aim to make crowdfunding easier and less
risky for investors, not riskier and unpredictable. A central database, for
income verification at least, may be more efficient anyway. If federal tax

284. Letter from Paul Spinrad, to SEC and Comment on Rulemaking File No. 4-605
(Aug. 26, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-605/4605-16.pdf; see also Jenny
Kassan, Sustainable Econ. L. Cent., Request for Rulemaking to Exempt Securities
Offerings up to $100 from Registration Under Section 5 of The Securities Act of 1933
(Jul. 1, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2010/petn4-605.pdf.
285. See id. at 2 (discussing the likelihood of a “large number of crowdfunding
offerings” creating enforcement difficulties for regulators).
286. See Bradford, Promise Unfulfilled, supra note 17, at 202 (calling “central
recordkeeping system” for intermediaries to rely on for §4A(a) aggregate limit
compliance as “[t]he only totally effective solution”).
287. White, supra note 266 (suggesting “the SEC was leaning towards the use of a
central database for verifying aggregate annual investment amounts instead of taking the
investor’s word for it” at a June 2012 rulemaking meeting).
288. Consider that CFIRA has already expressed concern over the tracking of as-yet
unknown intermediaries, recommending that FINRA create a system similar to the
existing regime for investment brokers. See Letter from CFIRA to Marcia E, Smith,
Office of the Corporate Sec’y, FINRA, FINRA Regulatory Notice 12-34: Request
for Comment on Proposed Regulation of Crowdfunding Activities, at 1-2 (Aug. 30,
2012), http://www.scribd.com/doc/105135058/Crowdfunding-Intermediary-RegulatoryAdvocates-Comments-Notice-12-34 (recommending that FINRA create “a registered
Portal-Check to list all intermediaries registered to conduct Crowdfunding similar to the
Broker-Check system currently maintained by FINRA.”).
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returns were used to verify income levels, for example, a federal agency is
likely to have an easier time partnering with the Internal Revenue Service to
retrieve such information.289 Consider, for instance, that the Department of
Education partners with the Internal Revenue Service to offer the upload of
federal tax information to streamline the Free Application for Federal
Student Aid (“FAFSA”).290
It may be true, however, that a centralized database—at least a taxpayerfunded one—is likely cost prohibitive.291 Consider that, when asked
whether it possessed a list of accredited investors in the U.S., the SEC told
the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) that it did not because, in
the words of the GAO, “maintaining such a list would be impractical
because there are so many accredited investors and could raise privacy
concerns.”292 Further, even if “maintaining such a list were possible, the
costs of doing so would likely outweigh the benefits.”293 Surely a list of
retail investors would be much larger than one of accredited investors,
suggesting that there is little hope for a centralized database to track investor
information.
Regardless, as stated above, the SEC Staff has thus far been unwilling to
publicly entertain the idea of creating an in-house system, and has rejected
calls for creating such a centralized database.294 The SEC Staff said in the
Proposed Crowdfunding Rule that “[w]hile the proposed rules would permit
reliance on a centralized database providing information about particular

289. White, supra note 266 (suggesting “the SEC was leaning towards the use of a
central database for verifying aggregate annual investment amounts instead of taking the
investor’s word for it” at a June 2012 rulemaking meeting). Freeman White is CEO of
Launcht, a crowd-funding website for “socially responsible startups.”).
290. FED. STUDENT AID, OFFICE OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., search results for “IRS,”
IRS Data Retrieval Tool, http://www.fafsa.ed.gov/help/irshlp9.htm (stating that “[t]he
IRS Data Retrieval Tool allows students and parents to access the IRS tax return
information . . . and transfer the data directly into their FAFSA from the IRS Web site”).
291. See Bradford, Promise Unfulfilled, 40 SEC. REG. L. J. at 202 (2012) (describing “a
central recordkeeping system” for aggregate investment enforcement as cost prohibitive).
292. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-640, ALTERNATIVE CRITERIA FOR
QUALIFYING AS AN ACCREDITED INVESTOR SHOULD BE CONSIDERED 17 (July 2013),
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/655963.pdf.
293. Id.
294. 78 Fed. Reg. 66,470 (Nov. 5, 2013) (citing “Spinrad Letter 1” which argued that
“[a] centralized database approach would make such aggregate checks very simple. . . .
[S]uch an approach could be self-funding . . . through the SEC’s taking a small fee from
each transaction.”); see also Letter from Paul Spinrad to SEC and Comment on
Regulatory Initiative Under JOBS Act: Title III (Jul. 26, 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-iii/jobstitleiii-114.pdf.
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investors, if it could help provide an intermediary with a reasonable basis for
a conclusion, we understand that none currently exists.”295
Perhaps another option for a central database would be a quasigovernmental organization funded in part by fees from intermediaries and
issuers. It is true that this would only further burden the nascent industry
with higher costs, so perhaps some sort of public-private partnership or
coordination with FINRA could be a viable option.
E. Multiple Verification Services Could Introduce Economic
Competitiveness, But May Complicate Information-Sharing.
Under another scenario, numerous third-party participants could compete
in a sub-market for the business of intermediaries seeking investment
information for potential crowdfunding investors. This could decrease costs
in the short-term. However, competitors would need to cooperate and share
very specific investment volume information (i.e. which investor is using
which intermediary website and how much each person is investing).296
When similar asymmetric relationships exist in a market, a single market
player often emerges. Consider economic developments in other Internetbased markets where there existed a structural vacuum, such as PayPal’s role
in the development of eBay or Verisign’s role in domain name registration.
Verisign, for instance, is the world’s largest Internet domain name registry
service and is also a publicly-traded company working in a partnership with
the federal government.297 Verisign retains the right to control and charge
fees for the ubiquitous “.com” website suffix under an agreement with the
Department of Commerce.298 The advantages are that the government hands
over technical implementation to the market, while the integrity of the
registration process is streamlined and functional. Verisign is required by
federal regulators to obtain permission before raising prices to cover its
security and stability costs.299 However, an antitrust case involving Verisign

295. 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,470 (Nov. 5, 2013).
296. At least one state securities regulator has acknowledged the necessity of
information-sharing. Galvin Comment Letter to SEC, supra note 283, at 3
(recommending that intermediaries be required to share information in order to “allow
other intermediaries to check compliance with this [crowdfunding investment] limit.”).
297. Fitzgerald, Drew, Chaudhuri, Saabira, VeriSign Limited in Raising Domain
Prices,
WALL
S T.
J.
(Nov.
30,
2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324705104578151071332357666.html.
298. Id.
299. Ted Bridis, VeriSign Is Allowed to Keep ‘.Com’ but Gives Up ‘.Org,’ WALL ST.
J. (Mar. 1, 2001), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB986229873245168534.html (full text
available also at Proquest) (stating that “[u]nder a 1999 agreement with the Clinton
administration, VeriSign retained long-term management control over the Internet’s
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outlines the disadvantages of this model: that overwhelming market
dominance by a single player could lead to the undesirable externalities of
monopolies, such as anti-competitiveness and monopolization charges by
customers, even with the approval of a federal executive agency.300 In any
case, this is only to suggest that perhaps the SEC should not be so dismissive
of some sort of other model before accepting a self-certification standard for
crowdfunding.
F. Summary of Investment Limit Enforcement Options.
Four basic options for enforcing the aggregate investment limits were
proposed above: (1) investor self-certification, which is the current standard
in the Proposed Crowdfunding Rule, (2) a government-conceived, taxpayerfunded centralized database, (3) a private solution with multiple players, or
(4) a private solution with one dominant provider with the blessing of the
Commission. Ideally, an SEC-run centralized database containing investor
limits and income levels would solve the regulatory problem. Intermediaries
would be protected from risk by having the security of relying on the same
clearing house, and the verification process itself could be more efficient if
investors were entrusting their information with one party, the SEC, in a
partnership with the IRS to retrieve federal tax returns of investors. The
obvious impediment is the cost to taxpayers.
VII. CONCLUSION.
Case law and SEC rulemakings have demonstrated time and again since
the passage of the Securities Act of 1933 that the primary goal of federal

master list of addresses only if it split the company by May 10. That condition was
fueled by concerns by regulators and rivals that VeriSign held unfair advantage by
managing the master directory and also selling Web addresses.”).
300. See, e.g., Coal. for ICANN Transparency, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 611 F.3d 495
(9th Cir. 2010). The 9th Circuit, in 2010, found that an organization of website owners,
the Coalition for ICANN Transparency, Inc. (“CFIT”), challenging the pricing and
implementation of the Internet domain name system (“DNS”) by the Internet Corporation
for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”) and Verisign, Inc. had stated a valid claim
of conspiracy in restraint of trade and attempted monopolization under §§ 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act. ICANN is the non-profit oversight body which oversees the DNS on
behalf of the Department of Commerce. Id. at 499. In overturning a lower court’s Fed.
Rules Civ. Proc. Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal for failure to state a claim, Circuit Judge
Schroeder stated that CFIT had validly alleged “that VeriSign’s predatory litigation
activity was aimed at coercing ICANN to perpetuate VeriSign’s role as exclusive
regulator of the .com domain name market by awarding VeriSign the 2006 .com
Agreement without any competitive bidding, and by agreeing to the terms that favored
VeriSign.” Id. at 506.
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securities laws has been investor protection. Congress and the Commission
have struggled over the years to balance reasonable access to the financial
markets and capital formation with this vital need to protect unsophisticated
investors from fraud. Congress articulated laudable goals with its passage of
the CROWDFUND Act: an alternative source of capital formation for
entrepreneurs and increased access to the equity markets for ordinary
Americans. The President downplayed “laws that are eight decades old,”
which he said prevent ordinary Americans from participating in capital
markets, calling the bill a “game changer.”301
The Comment has mapped out how there are useful small issuer
exemptions already on the books, but that crowdfunding does have the
potential to transform the manner in which startups form capital, especially
in the biotechnology industry, chiefly because of the personal stake investors
will have in seeking out medical solutions through social media. However,
crowdfunding efforts by life sciences and biotechnology startups may
produce a toxic combination of bad actors and particularly hopeful
unsophisticated investors. So, did Congress and the SEC ignore decades of
evidence that fraud pervades the securities marketplace, and will the new
crowdfunding exemption usher in a new wave of boiler room schemes and
pump-and-dump penny stock scandals?
Perhaps. Congress specifically enacted measures to mitigate against these
very real risks. The potential extension of liability to intermediaries for
materially false representations made by underlying issuers may serve as a
meaningful backstop against fraud. However, such liability still presumes
that investors possess the means, willingness, and capacity to file civil
actions against scam artists. The chief investor protection measures in the
CROWDFUND Act are the single-issuer and aggregate investment limits.
As Senator Merkley articulated, these are the provisions that prevent an
elderly American on a fixed income from losing his whole life savings by
“investing” in some charlatan’s false Internet promise.
According to the Proposed Crowdfunding Rule, the SEC staff considers
self-certification by investors to be the most realistic option for compliance
with these requirements, in part because it would be just too difficult for
various intermediaries to track aggregate investment activity on multiple
other funding portals nationwide. However, mere reliance on investors
undermines the Congressional intent of the aggregate investment limits. The
versions of the JOBS Act that contained self-verification, which originated
in the House of Representatives, were rejected by the Senate. The SEC thus
far has failed to note this fact. Reliance on investors may come at a high

301. President Obama’s Remarks on Signing the JOBS Act, 2012 DAILY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 1-2 (Apr. 5, 2012), 2012 U.S.C.C.A.N. S4.
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cost of market uncertainty and increased risk that crowdfunding as a capital
formation strategy may not come to fruition. Both of these possibilities
should be taken more seriously.
A third-party verification regime overseen by the SEC or FINRA would
provide the safest protection from fraudsters and reduce risks of liability for
funding portals. It could also provide a stable and trusted set of custodians
for investors’ financial information. The SEC’s Proposed Crowdfunding
Rule fails to adequately contemplate the establishment of a centralized
clearing house to verify investor qualifications or even some sort of role for
third party verification services. The lack of imagination and discussion in
the proposed rule release is not surprising, given that the SEC staff is likely
eagerly awaiting critical feedback from the crowdfunding and investing
communities to incorporate more data and further develop the final rule.
However, the fact remains that self-verification will likely result in
inadequate compliance with the statutory limits. Self-certification does not
align with the Congressional intent behind the statutory limits, and is likely
to behave as essentially a non-standard. This may dash the hopes that young
biotechnology startups have for equity crowdfunding as a meaningful capital
formation tool moving forward. Entrepreneurs, funding portals, and potential
crowdfunding investors should request that the SEC explain more fully how
unfeasible it would be to, at minimum, require that intermediaries verify
investor income or net worth when investors try to invest above a certain
threshold. Further, absent establishing its own central database, creating one
at FINRA, or developing a registration system for third party verification
services, the SEC should at least require intermediaries to share aggregate
investment information with each other in order to facilitate meaningful
compliance with intermediaries’ statutory mandate to “ensure” aggregate
limits.302

302. Like, for instance, in the same manner in which Secretary Galvin advocates that
intermediaries should be “required” to share information. Galvin Comment Letter to
SEC, supra note 283 (recommending that intermediaries be required to share
information).

